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## The American Bataan Campaign December 1941 to April 1942

Thomas M. Huber

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During the first eight months of the Pacific War, the Philippine Islands were the only place in which the United States was able to engage its adversaries in ground warfare. U.S. and Philippine forces faced special challenges in the Philippines, since their contact with the United States as a source of supply and reinforcement was almost completely cut off. What methods did U.S. forces rely on to cope with this set of circumstances, and how effective were they?

### Background and Planning

The only resistance offered by U.S. ground forces early in the Pacific War was on the Bataan Peninsula in the Philippine Islands. Two weeks elapsed, however, between the Japanese landings at Lingayen Gulf on 24 December 1941 and the establishment of a defense line on Bataan by American and Philippine forces. Moreover, conditions elsewhere during these two weeks (but also on Bataan) were greatly influenced by planning decisions made earlier in the Philippines and in Washington.

Before 1935 the defense of the Philippine Islands had rested on the American 10,000-man garrison, half of which consisted of Philippine Scouts units; that is, units in which the enlisted men were Filipinos and almost all officers were Americans. There was also a native Philippine Constabulary created in 1901 to maintain law and order. But when the Philippines became a commonwealth in 1935 with full independence slated for 1946, all parties expected the native Philippine government to take over responsibility for the islands' defense. President-elect Manuel Quezon prevailed on Douglas MacArthur, then retiring as U.S. Army chief of staff, to become military adviser to the

commonwealth government. MacArthur formed a small committee at the U.S. Army War College that included Maj. Dwight D. Eisenhower and Maj. James B. Ord to prepare a plan that would assure Philippine defense by 1946, the date for independence. Their plan called for a small regular army, a system of conscription, and a ten-year training program of two classes per year, as well as some air and naval elements. The plan was enacted into law as the National Defense Act by the new Philippine National Assembly in December 1935.

The act specified a standing force of 10,000 troops and reserves of 400,000 by 1946. The regular force was to include the 6,000-man Philippine Constabulary, so there would be some continuity of training and tradition. The act also provided for a conscription system and created an academy to train officers at Baguio. Under the new system 20,000 men were called to the colors in 1937, and the authorities were thus able to create a reserve of 4,800 officers and 104,000 men by the end of 1939. Philippine Scouts were used for instruction of the new troops. Some of these were promoted to noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and later to junior officers. A Philippine Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) program also provided some native Philippine officers while the Baguio academy was still preparing its first class.

While attention was paid to fashioning a new force structure, the Americans also gave some thought to how those forces would be used. MacArthur, in his capacity as military adviser, drew up comprehensive plans for the autonomous defense of all the islands and the seven straits, with no reliance on U.S. forces, to be implemented by 1946 when the Philippines became independent. This was the terminus ad quem at which the establishment of the Philippine Army was aimed. Meanwhile, however, the Philippines fell within the sphere of American war planning, especially the RAIN-

BOW plans which were prepared by the War Department beginning in 1939. These incorporated the older color plans, including War Plan ORANGE that covered the Philippine area, and assumed that in case of attack, U.S. forces would attempt only to control Manila Bay by withdrawing to Bataan and holding there until reinforcements could arrive.

This status quo, with a gradually developing national army and a passive defense plan, obtained until early 1941, when tensions in the region stirred MacArthur to seek both more ambitious plans and a more ambitious force structure. Maj. Gen. George Grunert was named commander of the Philippine Department in June 1940, and in the course of requesting more assets, sent a succession of warning reports to Washington in the latter months of 1940. These were disregarded by the War Department, however, which believed that such resources as were available had to go first to strengthen Alaska, Hawaii, and Panama.

The War Department's concern was already growing, however, when MacArthur wrote to Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall on 1 February 1941 asking for a rapid buildup of Philippine forces. MacArthur worked from the premise of comprehensive defense by native forces of the Philippines, including Luzon, the Visayans, and the waters between. Thus he asked Marshall to sanction the organization of 30 reserve

divisions, for a total ground force of 250,000, to be complete by the end of 1941. He also asked for naval and air elements and coastal defense guns. Meanwhile, Grunert, who was asking only for more modest resources for the U.S. garrison, still thought in terms of a limited defense of Manila Bay only. Marshall promised MacArthur his defense material and reassured Grunert it would not be at his expense.

By summer the sense of crisis in the area had deepened further. On 7 July 1941 MacArthur sent a letter to the War Plans Division requesting formation of a Far East Command. On 17 July 1941 War Plans Division chief Brig. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow recommended to Marshall (among other measures) that all Philippine Commonwealth forces be brought into the U.S. service for the duration of the perceived emergency; that a regional command, U.S. Army Forces, Far East (USAFFE), be established; and that MacArthur be brought back to active duty as a major general (his permanent rank) to head it. These steps were approved by Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson on 26 July 1941.

These actions represented a major, if tardy, increase in the War Department's commitment to the Philippines. U.S. Army forces in the Philippines at that time totaled 22,532 troops, of which 10,473 were in the Philippine Division, and 2,073 in other combat units. The remaining troops were devoted to harbor defense,



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air, and service activities. Of the 22,532 total, approximately 10,500 were Americans and 12,000 were Philippine Scouts. Authorities in the Philippines and Washington now cooperated to expand these numbers rapidly.

In mid-August MacArthur ordered that the first regiment from each of the ten reserve divisions report for duty by 1 November. In mid-November he ordered the second regiment of each to report by 1 January. The Philippine Commonwealth divisions were to keep their own uniforms, scale of pay, promotion lists, and so on, but were to be paid by the U.S. Army. The Philippine Commonwealth's Regular Army and the Philippine Constabulary, however, were not to be brought into the American forces immediately. To each of the reserve divisions being activated forty American officers and twenty American or Philippine Scout noncommissioned officers were assigned as instructors.

The ten reserve divisions would have about 7,500 troops each by mid-December, some 75,000 men, to which would be added a few thousand more in nondivisional organizations. The Philippine units were hampered by their lack of a common language and by the fact that many of their troops, including NCOs and clerks, were illiterate. In mid-December the Philippine units also suffered from being minimally clothed and equipped.


While Philippine forces were being mobilized beginning in August, so too were American forces being augmented, especially air forces. There had been a gradual buildup before August, including an increase in the Philippine Scouts from 6,415 to 12,000 troops, 81 P-40 fighter planes, 9 B-17 bombers, a tank battalion, 54 M-4 tanks, and 50 75-mm. antitank guns. The pace of augmentation quickened in November. The War Department sent 10 pack howitzers, 178 75-mm. guns, 123 .30-caliber machine guns, 100 flamethrowers, and 15,000 land mines. The department also sent more planes, for a total of 194 aircraft by early December, including 35 B-17s, 107 P-40s, and 52 P-35s.

The number of troops also increased from 22,532 (31 July 1941), of whom 10,500 were Americans, to 31,095 (30 November 1941), of whom 19,000 were Americans. These were in addition to the approximately 80,000 Philippine Commonwealth troops that had been raised by December, so that the total USAFFE ground forces came to about 111,700 troops—still less than the 200,000 troops MacArthur estimated on 1 October were necessary for defense. As it happened, 19,000 more American troops plus military equipment were embarked for the Philippines in early December,

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but had to turn back after the Japanese attack.

At the same time that the Philippine and U.S. force structure was expanding—from September through November—so too were the goals of the Philippine defense planners expanding. The ORANGE Plans for the defense of the Philippines had existed for many years. The latest revision of these MacArthur inherited was War Plan ORANGE-3 (WPO-3), completed in April 1941. In WPO-3 the planners assumed that the Japanese would attack with less than forty-eight hours' warning from U.S. intelligence, that they would employ a force of about 100,000 troops, and that they would land in many places simultaneously. WPO-3 provided that American forces would resist on the beaches, resist inland, and if that failed, withdraw to the Bataan Peninsula to retain control of Manila Bay.

WPO-3 divided Luzon into six sectors, each of which was to fashion its own detailed defense and be independently provisioned. In the event of withdrawal to Bataan, each sector was to transport its own supplies to the peninsula. The beach forces were required to delay the Japanese advance long enough for stores to be moved to Bataan and Corregidor from depots around Manila. The Bataan forces were then to hold out for six months, by which time the U.S. Navy was to have fought its way back to the Philippines with reinforcements. In early 1941 some U.S. planners in the Philippines doubted that a Bataan garrison could be relieved after six months, and instead felt that the garrison would exhaust its supplies and be defeated. Nonetheless, the official policy was that the Bataan force would survive until communications were reopened.

The buildup of forces in the fall of 1941, however, led both MacArthur and planners in Washington to aspire to operational objectives far grander than those of WPO-3. On receiving a recent version of the RAINBOW 5 comprehensive war plans, which essentially confirmed WPO-3 in the Philippine area, MacArthur wrote to Marshall on 1 October 1941 asking for a more comprehensive plan. He wanted the "citadel-type defense" of WPO-3 to be abandoned in favor of an active defense of all the Philippine Islands and adjoining waters. MacArthur, of course, probably had been thinking in these terms ever since he—as military adviser to the Philippine president—was charged with developing plans for Philippine national defense. From the Philippine point of view, the archipelago was not an expendable forward base, which perhaps it was to some of the originators of WPO-3.

By the fall of 1941 Marshall and the personnel in the War Plans Division (WPD) agreed with MacArthur

that the material in or on its way to the Philippines justified grander aspirations for its use. Brig. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow of the WPD sent a memo to Marshall on 8 October outlining the WPD's position on the Philippines. He asserted that the new force levels should be enough to discourage the Japanese from attacking, given Japan's involvement in China, Soviet resistance to Germany, and the economic embargoes against Japan. He especially felt that strong air forces placed in the Philippines would provide offensive powers that would deter the Japanese from acting. Gerow's view was that reinforcement of the Philippines meant the Japanese were unlikely to move against the U.S. presence there, which would allow concentration of Allied resources on the struggle against Germany.

Based on this newly optimistic and confident consensus in Washington, Marshall dispatched a memorandum to MacArthur on 18 October, giving him greatly enlarged operational goals. MacArthur was to defend not only all the Philippine Islands and adjacent waters but also to cooperate with the Navy to raid Japanese sea communications, conduct air raids, and help defend the territories of the Associated Powers.

Marshall's note to this effect apparently was hand delivered to MacArthur on 3 November by Maj. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton. Marshall also had written that a new plan comprehending the points in his memo already had been drafted and would soon be considered by the Joint Board of Army and Navy planners, who actually would approve it on 21 November. But MacArthur had begun already on 4 November to carry out a force reorganization compatible with the intent of the new plan.

The extraordinary efforts of the American military leaders to strengthen the Philippines in the autumn of 1941 in the end made them confident that their forces were adequate. Their confidence rested largely on the premise that sea and ground attack could be deterred by the modest presence of air forces. This confidence, however, proved unwarranted. The optimistic mood of mid-November gave way by the end of the month to the conviction that the Japanese might soon attack the Philippines because of the failure of the Hull-Nomura talks. The American ambassador to Tokyo, Joseph Grew, cabled to Washington on 17 November that there might be a sudden Japanese attack outside the current China theater. On 24 November, U.S. Navy Chief of Naval Operations Harold R. Stark sent his Pacific commanders a communication to be shared with their Army colleagues in which he warned of the

possibility of a surprise aggressive act against either the Philippines or Guam. On 27 November the War Department sent a "final alert" to MacArthur, noting that negotiations with Japan had broken down, and that in the event of hostilities, MacArthur should execute the RAINBOW strategy.

MacArthur called a conference of his commanders after the 27 November message and advised them of the tense situation. He ordered the North Luzon Force (one of the four commands into which American forces in the islands were divided) to be ready to move to assigned positions of beach defense. It was not long thereafter before USAFFE had the opportunity to test whether its preparations were adequate and its plans realistic.

#### **The Approach to Bataan (24 December 1941 to 7 January 1942)**

The Japanese Pacific offensives that began on 7 December 1941 (8 December in the Philippines) had two devastating features that USAFFE planners did not anticipate: the Japanese struck American rear naval bases at the same time that they attacked advanced bases, and they used their air power offensively to neutralize completely American air and naval assets in the Philippine area. The upshot was that the Philippines suddenly had to be defended with the ground assets on hand, because USAFFE had no supply line and no air resources left.

Japanese naval and air forces crippled the U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor on 7 December, and on 8 December bombed Clark Field on Luzon and other points, destroying half of the American aircraft in the islands in one day. The Japanese used large fleets of bombers and fighter bombers based on Taiwan. The Japanese air fleets came again on 10, and 12-13 December, pounding U.S. air and naval assets and bases.

American forces responded in the only way they could. The remainder of the Philippine-based U.S. Asiatic Fleet departed for Australia on 10 December rather than be needlessly destroyed. Most remaining American aircraft did the same. On 17 December the B-17s still able to fly lifted off Del Monte field in the Visayans for Darwin. Exclusion of U.S. air and naval power from the western Pacific was then assured by Japanese landings on Guam on 10 December and on Wake on 23 December. These seizures meant that Midway, 4,500 miles away, was now the nearest American base to the Philippine Islands—the Philippines could expect no early relief.

The bold knockout blows of early December put

the Japanese in a position to devote their attention to land invasion of the Philippines. Japanese forces seized advanced bases in the archipelago on Bataan and Camiguin Islands, just north of Luzon on 8 and 10 December. They captured key points on the north Luzon coast on 10 December, on far south Luzon on 12 December, and on Mindanao on 20 December.

The main Japanese invasion force, the *Imperial Japanese Army 14th Army* under Lt. Gen. Masaharu Homma, landed on the east shore of Lingayen Gulf on 22 December. USAFFE failed to resist these landings, with the exception of the headquarters battalion of the 12th Infantry, Philippine Army (PA), which directed some machine gun fire at the Japanese landing party. The enemy put ashore a secondary force in extreme southeastern Luzon on Christmas Eve, with the objective of having the northern and southern forces converge on Manila.

From their landing area, the Japanese advanced easily on 23 December about ten miles southeastward, into the Luzon interior, toward Manila. MacArthur thus realized on 23 December that his Philippine forces could not contain the Japanese on the beaches as he had previously hoped. During the period 12-22 December he had ordered his line units to stand fast, but also made hasty preparations to withdraw to Bataan if need be. By the 23d, however, MacArthur made up his mind and notified all his commanders that WPO-3 was now effective, that is, the operational plan now was to withdraw all USAFFE forces to Bataan. Ironically, MacArthur had deliberately discarded WPO-3 in November in favor of an active defense. Fortunately for him, WPO-3 was still familiar to all participants, so that it could be carried out quickly despite its earlier abandonment as policy.

USAFFE headquarters moved from Manila to Corregidor on the night of 24-25 December, and the effort began to transport supplies to Bataan and Corregidor as rapidly as possible. Using a flotilla of small boats, USAFFE G-4 placed supplies for 10,000 troops for six months on Corregidor within twenty-four hours. Supplies were then directed toward Bataan, using water, truck, and rail. Small craft were essential for the supply movement to the peninsula, where ammunition, gasoline, and 3,000 tons of canned meat and fish previously had been stored.

For the Bataan plan to work, the commander of the North Luzon Force, Maj. Gen. Jonathan M. Wainwright, had to hold the Japanese north of San Fernando, where Route 3 coming up from the south meets Route 7 going into Bataan. Wainwright had to hold the

intersection long enough for the South Luzon Force to pass through it and enter the peninsula. The South Luzon Force was to withdraw northward toward San Fernando, then turn southwest into the peninsula. It was crucial that the South Luzon Force hold the Calumpit bridges until its assets had crossed.

On 24 December, meanwhile, the Bataan Defense Force was established to prepare a defensive line on the peninsula to be manned by the main forces when they arrived. Maj. Gen. George M. Parker temporarily was removed from command of the South Luzon Force to supervise this work. The U.S. Army's Philippine Division (US) was already in Bataan, and the Philippine 31st and 41st Divisions (PA) soon arrived to help with the construction work. The defensive positions were surveyed and marked out by the 14th Engineers (Philippine Scouts, PS), and the actual digging of foxholes and laying of wire was done by troops from the various divisions as they arrived.

MacArthur ordered Wainwright and the North Luzon Force to hold the San Fernando intersection until 8 January. He was to do this by deploying five successive defense lines. After forming a line and forcing the advancing Japanese to halt in preparation for an attack, he was immediately to withdraw to a line farther to the rear and force the Japanese to halt again. This exercise was to be repeated five times. Wainwright's object was to achieve a maximum delay with minimal of casualties and to enter Bataan intact.

Each defense line was to be held during the day, then evacuated at night for the next line, which was to be established before dawn. A shell force was to remain behind to hold the old line until just before dawn. The defense lines were too long to be continuous and in practice they often covered only the most likely avenues of enemy approach.

The North Luzon Force had reconnoitered the five defense lines in peacetime and arrayed them one day's march apart, making use of natural defensive features such as rivers, high ground, and swamps. They blocked Routes 3 and 5, the main roads southward. The first line was sited where the North Luzon Force found itself on Christmas Eve, about ten miles behind the Lingayen beaches.

The principal North Luzon Force units holding the five lines were, from west to east, the 21st, 11th, and 91st Divisions (PA), and the 26th Cavalry (PS). Commanders sought to have mutually supporting infantry and artillery elements on the line, but in practice this could not always be done. It was difficult to move supplies for North Luzon Force units, which were in

almost constant motion. They were supposed to carry what supplies they could to Bataan and destroy the rest, but this goal was not achieved completely. Supply problems were complicated by the shortage of motor vehicles in which supplies arrived and the tendency of commanders to appropriate the vehicles in which the supplies arrived, thereby removing the vehicle from the logistics net.

By Christmas Day the North Luzon Force had fallen back to the second line, where Japanese forces managed to attack them, breaking through at Carmen. The American forces retired to the third line by 27 December, but were not engaged there because the Japanese stopped at the Agno River to reform. By 29 December the North Luzon Force had withdrawn to the fourth line. Wainwright was alarmed that the South Luzon Force had not yet cleared the Calumpit bridges and therefore ordered his units to stand at all costs at their present positions, the Tarlac line. In the original plan, however, only the fifth line—not the fourth—was organized for a protracted defense.

Japanese forces attacked the Tarlac line, which held until 30 December, largely because of a firm stand by the 3d Battalion of the 21st Division (PA). On 30 December elements of the Tarlac line were ordered back to the fifth line, which was established by the morning of 31 December. Over seven days the North Luzon Force had withdrawn about fifty miles.

Meanwhile the South Luzon Force also was withdrawing toward Bataan. Since General Parker had left to organize Bataan on Christmas Eve, Maj. Gen. Albert M. Jones was the force's commander. Smaller than the North Luzon Force, the South Luzon Force consisted only of the 1st and 51st Divisions (PA) with some attached artillery and armor assets. The South Luzon Force was not hard pressed by the Japanese in the way the northern force was, however, and its withdrawal northward toward Bataan was for the most part smooth and orderly. Most of the South Luzon Force crossed the Calumpit bridges and arrived at San Fernando by 31 December.

By this time (on 30 December) General Homma had dispatched an enemy force toward Plaridel. This movement lay to the east of the main Japanese axis of advance and threatened to prevent the last arriving of the South Luzon Force units from crossing the Calumpit bridges. MacArthur, therefore, assembled a force to defend Plaridel, consisting of the retreating 71st Division (PA) and elements of the South Luzon Force passing near Plaridel on their way north. These units successfully delayed the advance of the enemy force.

The last of the troops at Plaridel withdrew northwest across the Calumpit bridges at 0500 1 January 1942. The bridges immediately were destroyed at Wainwright's order at 0615. American observers were relieved that Japanese air power, apparently unaware of the bridges' importance to the American operational plan, had not attacked the bridges in force.

Once it was clear the South Luzon Force would reach San Fernando, the North Luzon Force began evacuating its fifth defense line and moving through San Fernando for Bataan. The last U.S. forces moved through the town for Bataan at 0200 on 2 January, pressed by the *Kanno Detachment*, which attacked to the west of the main Japanese axis. Again, Japanese planes, perhaps occupied with the *Imperial Japanese Army's* drive for Manila, did not attack the crowded roads.

American commanders still sought to delay a Japanese advance to give troops in Bataan time to enter and prepare their lines. To this end, the 21st and 11th Divisions (PA) took up positions, where they soon were pressured by two reinforced Japanese regiments, the *Takabashi* and *Tanaka Detachments*. The 21st and 11th Divisions were forced back, but still kept the Japanese north of the Culo River until 6 January. The last of the American rear guard force crossed the Culo River at 0200 on 6 January, and the 91st Engineer Battalion blew up the bridge behind them. The 11th and 21st Divisions formed still another line near the Culo River, from which they withdrew on the morning of 7 January. This delay of the Japanese at Bataan's base went according to WPO-3 and was successfully executed, giving U.S. engineers additional time to prepare the Abucay-Mauban defense line on the peninsula.

The fighting around Layac junction marked the end of the American forces' long withdrawal to the peninsula that began on 23 December. Subsequent fighting on Bataan would no longer have the quality of a maneuver withdrawal.

#### **The Abucay-Mauban Line (7-26 January 1942)**

The next phase of the Philippine campaign would take place entirely within the confined area of the Bataan Peninsula. Bataan is about twenty-five miles long and twenty miles wide, covered by jungles, mountainous, and scored by several streams and deep ravines. Two extinct volcanoes mark the center of the peninsula, Mt. Natib toward the north and Mt. Bataan in the south. There are numerous overgrown trails on the peninsula, but only two roads; Route 110 along the

coast and the Pilar-Bagac road bisecting the peninsula from east to west.

The American forces were relieved finally to be in a position they did not have to abandon immediately. They established a line about a third of the way down the peninsula, bisected by Mt. Natib, which left a gap in the line. The sector from Mt. Natib west to Mauban was commanded by General Wainwright and designated the I Philippine Corps, altogether about 22,500 troops. The corps consisted of the 1st, 31st, and 91st Divisions (PA), and the 26th Cavalry Regiment (PS), and a battery each of field artillery and self-propelled 75-mm. guns.

The sector from Mt. Natib eastward was designated the II Philippine Corps and placed under General Parker. Consisting of about 25,000 men, it was made up of the 11th, 21st, 41st, and 51st Divisions (PA), plus the 57th Infantry (PS) from the Philippine Division (US).

Between the two corps was Mt. Natib, 4,222 feet high, jungled, and impenetrable. Mt. Natib prevented mutual reinforcement by the two corps, and also left the interior flanks of both corps somewhat up in the air—a major tactical flaw in the line. U.S. commanders believed they could not put the line south of Mt. Natib and still protect the only road bisecting the peninsula from east to west. They may have avoided the terrain north of Mt. Natib because of the absence of roads.

South of the Abucay line and also bisecting the peninsula was a second defense line that roughly paralleled the east-west road from Pilar to Bagac. This line was not complete as of 7 January, so the Abucay line was to hold until this Pilar-Bagac line was finished. Part of the Philippine Division (US) and other units were kept at work on the second line through January. Corps and USAFFE artillery also were placed in this vicinity to cover both the Abucay line and any possible Japanese landings on the peninsula's southern coasts.

At the southern end of Bataan a Service Command Area was established under Brig. Gen. Allan C. McBride to help provide effective supply. Within this area were the 2d Division, made up of the former Philippine Constabulary (PC), elements of the 71st Division (PA), and provisional infantry units consisting of air troops, sailors, and marines. On 5 January MacArthur also established in the south a command echelon between his own USAFFE headquarters on Corregidor and the force on Bataan. Its commander was Brig. Gen. Richard J. Marshall, and its main functions were to direct the combat activities of the two line corps and to provide services for them. American combat units also

were posted along the coast in the south to oppose attempts at amphibious envelopment.

The Abucay-Mauban line, the main battle position on 7 January, had an outpost line flung out to its front and a regimental line in its rear. The eastern half of the line boasted a double apron of barbed wire, cleared fields of fire, foxholes, trenches, gun emplacements, and overhead camouflage. The western half of the line had some of these features, but was less developed.

Supplies for the Bataan force had been moved to the peninsula with miraculous speed after 23 December, but still were woefully inadequate. Once Corregidor's stockage was complete, the supplying of Bataan began in earnest. Only one method of transportation, small watercraft, proved effective. There were no railroads on Bataan, and the roads into the peninsula were jammed with troop traffic. Moreover, few trucks were available. Large vessels were on hand in Manila harbor, but quartermasters preferred smaller vessels, launches, tugs, and barges, because only these could easily be unloaded on the three primitive piers on Bataan. Manila was the main source of supply. About 30,000 tons were moved from the supply concentrations at Manila before Japanese forces occupied the city on 2 January. In theory supplies were supposed to be brought into Bataan by the North and South Luzon Forces. Both were expected to roll up military stocks in outlying depots and either transport them to Bataan or destroy them completely. In practice, however, these forces suffered from "withdrawal fever," and in their haste they failed to do so.

The biggest supply problem on Bataan proved to be food for the 80,000 USAFFE troops. MacArthur had put the Bataan force on half rations on 5 January, even before all the troops had arrived. Since 2,000 calories was about what active soldiers required, individuals and units resorted to local supply. Units harvested rice in the fields, set up a slaughter house for carabao, built a rice mill, purchased fish from Filipino fishermen, and made salt by boiling sea water. Individuals used their rifles for hunting carabao and other game.

Clothing was also scarce, especially for Philippine troops who received little issued clothing when they were mobilized. The PA soldiers' blue denim fatigue suits and rubber soled shoes wore through quickly in the jungle. All PA troops had quality rifles, but not all had steel helmets. Shelter halves, blankets, sun helmets, and mosquito netting were also in short supply. The resultant exposure to jungle weather, combined with the deficient diet, produced a high rate of malaria,

hookworm, and other diseases, made all the more serious by inadequate medical supplies, especially quinine.

Gasoline stocks were moderately adequate. Uncontrolled use during the first few weeks led to rapid depletion, so consumption was limited thereafter by rationing to 4,000 gallons daily. Motor vehicles were not easily available, so units commandeered them and sometimes hijacked both vehicles and their loads. The Bataan Service Command tried to counter this practice by ordering all nonorganic vehicles into motor pools. Military police searched for illicit vehicles, but commandeered vehicles were often well hidden. Many vehicles were reclaimed by the Bataan Service Command's motor pools when gasoline rationing was imposed. Unable to get fuel for their unofficial vehicles, units turned them in.

Engineering equipment moved to Bataan also was moderately adequate. The 10,000 tons delivered included 350 tons of explosives, 800 tons of barbed wire, 200 tons of burlap sacks, and large quantities of construction material. The supply situation, especially food, proved an important factor in the outcome of the Bataan fighting.

Combat engagement on the Abucay-Mauban line began at 1500, 9 January, when the Japanese laid a concentrated barrage on the eastern half of the line, then advanced their infantry at both ends of the line. The *Imperial Japanese Army* continued to press attacks along the American line 10-15 January, but with little success.

On 15 January, however, the *141st Infantry* penetrated the American line and lodged themselves on a small hill between the 51st and 41st Infantry Divisions (PA). This modest lodgment led to the collapse of the left flank of the Abucay line within a few days, largely because of confusion. At dawn on 16 January, the 51st Division (PA) counterattacked, its 51st Infantry making far more progress than its 53d Infantry, thus creating an exposed salient. The Japanese *9th Infantry* threatened the left, while the *141st Infantry* attacked and broke through on the right shoulder. The 51st Infantry (PA), thus threatened with double envelopment, fled far to the rear.

The *141st Infantry* turned left to attack the 43d Infantry (PA), which held its position and refused its flank, while the Japanese *9th Infantry* halted to regroup. Nevertheless, 53d Infantry (PA) feared attack and fell back. The chief of staff of the 51st Division (PA) also feared that the 53d Infantry (PA) would be overrun and, therefore, ordered its commander, Col. John R.



Boatwright, to move westward across Mt. Natib and link up with the right flank of I Corps. This relocation was a harrowing experience for the 53d Infantry, which became separated and dispersed in the impenetrable jungle. Ultimately, therefore, 53d Infantry's orders destroyed its integrity as a combat force for no reason.

These events of 16 January left the west flank of the Abucay line wide open. Nothing happened immediately, because the *9th Infantry*, ordered to infiltrate around the II Corps left flank, then east across the II Corps rear, also became lost in the jungle and so, like the 53d Infantry (PA), removed itself from the battle.

To restore II Corps' left flank, General Parker ordered an attack by his reserve, the Philippine Division (US), at dawn on 17 January. The Philippine Division and other elements advanced repeatedly against Japanese positions newly set up in the gap where the 51st Division (PA) had been, but as of 21 January still were unable to dislodge *Imperial Japanese Army* units from their salient above the Abucay Hacienda.

Meanwhile, General Wainwright in the I Corps sector was also hard pressed by the Japanese advance. On 15 January enemy forces engaged U.S. advanced units, pushing them back to the main lines at Mauban by the 18th. The whole American outpost line was driven in by nightfall on 19 January. Lt. Col. Hiroshi Nakanishi's *3d Battalion, 20th Infantry*, infiltrated around the east flank of I Corps, on the slopes of Mt. Natib, and on 21 January established a roadblock behind the 1st Division (PA), across the only road south capable of handling heavy equipment. Like the original lodgment of the *141st Infantry* in the II Corps sector, this battalion-size roadblock would lead to the collapse of the whole I Corps position.

Wainwright himself encountered the block on his way to the front and commandeered a platoon of the 92d Infantry Division (PA) headquarters to attack it. After a two-hour assault with no results, Wainwright directed a larger force against the position, led by 92d Infantry commander Col. John H. Rodman and consisting of elements of the 91st and 92d Infantry (PA), the 26th Cavalry (PS), and other units. Rodman's attacks on 22-23 January had no effect, however, perhaps because his numerous troops had little food and few automatic weapons.

Because of the continuing road blockage, by the evening of 24 January the U.S. main battle line was short of food and ammunition. Col. Kearie L. Berry, commanding the 1st Division (PA) on the I Corps line, without authorization ordered the division to withdraw

on the morning of the 25th. Since the road was blocked, the division had to move along the coast, which meant destroying all guns and heavy equipment that could not move on the beaches. The evacuation of the Mauban line was completed successfully by the evening of 25 January.

With both the I Corps and II Corps lines in disarray, Maj. Gen. Richard K. Sutherland, MacArthur's chief of staff, on 22 January already had given written orders to Wainwright and Parker to withdraw the whole force southward from the Abucay-Mauban line into the Pilar Bagac line. Heavy artillery and service elements were to go first, beginning after nightfall on 23 January. Combat elements were to depart the next day, leaving one company per battalion in place as a covering force. This shell was to retire starting at 0300, 25 January. All elements were to be behind the new line by dawn of the following day.

The evacuation went smoothly in the I Corps sector because it was under way already, but in the II Corps sector the withdrawal did not go as well. The artillery and service elements pulled back without incident on the night of 23-24 January. In the evacuation of the main combat units, however, there was considerable confusion, especially at the Y-shaped intersection of the east-west road between Abucay and Abucay Hacienda and the so-called Back Road running south. Traffic became horrendously congested and often stopped completely. No military police were on hand to regulate it, and whole units became dispersed just trying to cross. Officers trying to move the whole confused mass south were thankful that Japanese artillery did not apply interdiction fire to the spot.

II Corps troops were fortunate not to be bombed at the Back Road junction, but at other points they were not so lucky. *Imperial Japanese Army* air elements were aware of the retreat and bombed and strafed the crowded roads in force. Nevertheless, the American covering force held firm, keeping retreating forces from being overrun. The last U.S. troops to depart the Abucay line were the 31st Infantry (PS) at 0300, 25 January. On the morning of 26 January the 194th Tank Battalion (US) still held a line across the Back Road, until it was flanked from the west and Japanese artillery was brought to bear. The retreat of the 194th Tank Battalion marked the successful completion of the American withdrawal by both corps sectors into the Pilar-Bagac line, which was well manned, well engineered, and still unscarred by combat.

The operational flaw that forced the U.S. forces back lay in their planning. Failure to resolve the gap in

the Abucay-Mauban line created by Mt. Natib allowed the Japanese to isolate and destroy the left flank of the USAFFE II Corps more easily and to envelop the right flank of I Corps with a devastatingly effective road-block.

#### **The Pilar-Bagac Line (26 January to 9 April)**

USAFFE divided the Pilar-Bagac line between I and II Corps sectors at the Pantingan River. At least in this position the two sectors were in contact, forming a continuous line. The length of the coastline was reduced, making it easier to defend against amphibious envelopment. Mt. Samat on the II Corps side permitted good observation of the field, and II Corps placed its artillery there. In front of the line the Pilar-Bagac road could not be used for lateral movement, but American engineers linked a network of east-west trails for this purpose by mid-February.

The II Corps area, east of the Pantingan River, was divided into four sectors (A, B, C, and D, numbered from the coast), and the I Corps area west of the river was divided into left and right sectors. The Japanese, still in pursuit of the retreating Americans, attacked sector C on 27 January, but Brig. Gen. Clifford Bluemel stood firm with the 51st Division (PA) and the 32d Infantry (PA) against three concerted enemy attacks. Japanese units also attacked in the I Corps area on 30 January and 3 February, intruding elements behind the 1st Division (PA) lines and forming isolated pockets in the American area that were not eliminated until 17 February. Japanese attempts at amphibious envelopment by battalion-size units on 22 and 26 January and 1 February were contained and suppressed.

The new American line held at all points, to the surprise of the Japanese who had just pushed through the Abucay line. On 8 February, therefore, General Homma pulled all the *14th Army* forces back for a major force reorganization, while the morale of U.S. forces soared. Wainwright believed that morale on Bataan was higher after beating back the numerous attacks in early February than at any other time. USAFFE forces felt a sense of confidence and pride at this point. With experience they had begun to master the skills of jungle survival and jungle combat, and they were enjoying success. American patrols roamed boldly in front of the line, one as far north as the old Abucay defense line.

General Bluemel and some other II Corps officers began to favor a counteroffensive to retake the Abucay line. The II Corps headquarters staff rejected this proposal, however, on the grounds that a general offen-

sive would exhaust the resources needed to carry out the main mission—to hold Manila Bay as long as possible. Moreover, forces on the move would be exposed to Japanese air and sea superiority, and troops taking the offensive need more food, gasoline, and ammunition than those on the defensive. Even if U.S. forces successfully retook the Abucay line, that would only mean longer lines of communications and a longer coastal perimeter to defend. The II Corps headquarters believed that instead of thinking about an offensive, units should use the lull to strengthen their portions of the current defense line.

Although American morale was high in early February, the logistical predicament of the encircled USAFFE force would cause its fighting power to be weakened critically in the next two months, even though it was almost free of contact with the enemy. There was a chronic food shortage from the moment the forces entered the peninsula, as well as shortages of clothing and shelter halves and the like. Troops became extremely resourceful at foraging jungle flora and fauna, but nonetheless a severe shortage persisted.

In part because of these deprivations and in part because of the jungle environment, physical deterioration and illness affected the whole force. By March virtually all troops suffered serious malnutrition. This meant chronic fatigue, reduced immunity to illness, and avitaminotic diseases themselves: beriberi, scurvy, and amoebic dysentery. Beriberi, caused by a shortage of vitamin B, was common. Malnutrition also caused night blindness and edema.

Troops suffered from dengue fever and hookworm. But the most devastating disease troops faced was malaria. By March, 35 percent of the force actually had malaria, and many of the rest were infected. The situation was aggravated by the location of the Pilar-Bagac line in the malaria-infested lowland between Mt. Natib and the Mariveles Mountains.

In January all infected troops were given quinine, but by March there was not an adequate supply even for the actual sufferers. Dysentery serum, gangrene gas antitoxin (to avoid amputations), and some sulfa drugs, also ran low, although some other drugs lasted to the end of the campaign. Surgical hospitals functioned efficiently to the cessation of hostilities, though they were increasingly overburdened. Although it is not clear why, there were almost no hospitalizations because of psychological disorders.

By the end of March American fighting power was badly eroded by the cumulative effect of hunger and illness. In many units half or more of the troops were

incapacitated by malaria and dysentery. Of those left, officers commonly reported 50 percent combat efficiency—sometimes as low as 20 percent. Many troops were able merely to fire a rifle from a trench, but no more. They could not do physical labor, such as carrying a pack while retreating. These conditions contributed to a cumulative psychological fatigue in the force. At an earlier stage, stragglers often could be rallied just by an officer's encouragement to go back into battle. Later in the campaign, however, stragglers discarded their equipment and ignored such pleas as they became physically exhausted and mentally unequal to combat duty.

Meanwhile, General Homma's *14th Army* was preparing for a major assault against the deteriorating U.S. line. The American troops were aware that the *14th Army* was moving men and supplies into Bataan, and also discovered that Homma had put a counterreconnaissance screen in front of his line during the second week of March to obstruct U.S. patrols. This screen was moved to within 1,000 yards of the American positions, i.e., the coming attack's line of departure, by the last week of March. In this final week Japanese artillery and aerial bombardment, previously desultory, became intense and fell at all hours.

The long-anticipated Japanese offensive finally came on 3 April, after a heavy aerial and artillery bombardment from 1000 to 1500. The bombardment and the following infantry assault were both focused on the left front of II Corps, Sector D, commanded by Brig. Gen. Maxon S. Lough. In this sector were the 21st and 41st Divisions (PA), each with three regiments on the line. Against this force General Homma hurled the *4th Division* and the *65th Brigade*, both heavily reinforced.

The five-hour preparatory bombardment had driven out the malnourished and weakened Filipino troops. They were frightened, choked by the dust, and burned by shell-ignited brush fires. They fled south in disorganized mobs and nothing could stop them. The burden of living in the jungle without resources for two months had almost destroyed U.S. forces on the Pilar-Bagac line even without further intervention by the Japanese. One wonders, however, whether moving the U.S. force underground into a trench and tunnel system might not have allowed the line to survive the heavy 3 April bombardment.

General Lough felt that the 42d Infantry (PA) was a total loss, but tried to put the 41st, 43d, and 33d Infantries (PA) in position to block the Japanese advance. On 4 April the Japanese attacked further into

their breakthrough on the west side of Sector D and also attacked with tanks on the east side. The result was that Sector D disintegrated, and the 21st Division (PA) was driven back to its reserve position northeast of Mt. Samat, with its left flank exposed because of the 41st Division's disappearance.

In this emergency, General Parker, II Corps commander, gave Lough the 31st and 45th Infantries (PA and PS) and other reinforcements and instructed him to counterattack on the morning of 6 April. The 45th Infantry (PS) was to advance along with the 31st and 33d up three jungle trails, while General Bluemel, commander of Sector C, was to support the attack with artillery and a simultaneous assault by the 51st Combat Team on Sector C's left flank.

On the same day the Japanese launched a major attack in this same area. The *65th Brigade* was to make a holding attack on the west flank of U.S. Sector D, while the *4th Division* attacked on the east flank and tried to break through. The result was that on 6 April the *4th Division* met the Philippine Army units on the trails, driving them back, breaking through the American position, isolating II Corps from I Corps, overrunning Mt. Samat (II Corps' artillery position), and capturing critical trail junctions in the II Corps rear.

The American San Vicente line proved to be ineffectual. General Homma resolved to strike through to the east coast, then move southward. Although General Bluemel hurriedly sought to set up three defense lines along a succession of rivers, these were unable to obstruct the Japanese southward advance.

As the Japanese *8th Infantry* and the *Nagano Detachment* continued rapidly south, General Bluemel's resistance failed and American II Corps units fled in great confusion. Commanders of combat regiments had no idea where their units were. Command and control in the II Corps sector evaporated after 6 April, as *Imperial Japanese Army* air power strafed the refugee-clogged trails.

Maj. Gen. Edward P. King, commander of Luzon Force, was forced to cope with the sudden collapse of II Corps. General MacArthur had left Corregidor for Australia with the USAFFE headquarters staff on 12 March. Wainwright had been promoted on Corregidor to commander of what nominally was a new organization, the U.S. Forces in the Philippines (USFIP). Wainwright chose General King as chief of Luzon Force, making him Wainwright's operational commander on Bataan.

King's I Corps was still holding as of 8 April, though his forces dropped southward to avoid being

flanked by the deep Japanese penetration of 6 April. This withdrawal did not alleviate King's dilemma, however, since the Japanese forces continued moving rapidly toward his headquarters. King therefore finally ordered the Provisional Coastal Artillery Brigade (AA) to turn away from the coast and form as infantry just north of Cabcaben.

Wainwright had standing orders from MacArthur not to surrender, and in fact late on 8 April Wainwright ordered King to attack with I Corps north toward Olongapo. Nevertheless, King determined at a conference of his staff officers that evening that the Japanese would soon be in artillery range not only of the U.S. hospitals and service areas near Mariveles on the coast, but also of Corregidor itself. This would be the case whether the Americans continued to resist or not, so there was no tactical reason to further endanger hospital patients, service troops, or combat forces. Although he had no authorization from Wainwright, King announced to his staff at midnight that he intended to surrender.

King met with the advancing Maj. Gen. Kameichiro Nagano on 9 April and attempted to negotiate surrender terms for all of Luzon Force. Nagano took King prisoner but did not give any terms or recognize any surrender of the whole force. American units were still obliged to surrender individually and unconditionally to whatever enemy units they encountered, an arrangement that led to the unhappy events of the Bataan Death March.

There would be more travail for U.S. troops on Bataan, and more combat on Corregidor, but as of 9 April the American operational campaign on Bataan was over.

### Conclusion

The sudden disintegration of USFIP forces after 3 April 1942 suggests that the American Bataan campaign was a failure. Despite this impression, the Bataan operation was a substantial success in many respects. Facing an opposing force that was greater in numbers, reinforceable, dramatically better supplied, and supported by complete air and sea dominance, U.S. ground units resisted effectively for three and a half months. Their efforts tied down a corps-size contingent of the *Imperial Japanese Army*, preventing its use elsewhere, and distracted higher-echelon Japanese planners who were forced to continue devoting their finite energies to the recalcitrant Philippine problem. The rugged resistance on Bataan also increased the confidence of the gathering Allied war effort in a way that

combat actions in Malaya and elsewhere had not done.

Perhaps the most significant factor in the Bataan achievement was the overall operational plan of retiring to an area of such strategic importance that an adversary had to attack it, yet an area that was extremely favorable to the defender. Bataan was just such a terrain. It controlled the international port of Manila, which the Japanese needed. But it presented such a narrow land front to an attacker that advantages of numbers, equipment, and mobility could not easily be brought to bear. Moreover, the mountainous terrain covered with jungles on Bataan offered limited fields of fire, which mitigated the effect of an adversary's superior firepower. Once the U.S. forces put a line across the peninsula, it was difficult for the Japanese to advance regardless of how many units they had in the area. The credit for this method must go to the operational planners who devised WPO-3. Resourceful staff officers designed the Bataan solution before war in the Philippines even seemed likely.

The Bataan plan was not perfectly executed, however, in several respects. Supply on Bataan was disastrously inadequate, and the reason for this was that MacArthur, beginning in October 1941, abandoned the modest defensive Bataan solution in favor of an active defense of the whole Philippine archipelago. Moreover, both he and his superiors in the War Department believed that introducing moderate air assets into the Philippines would make defense of all the islands possible, and perhaps deter attack altogether. MacArthur failed to appreciate that moderate air assets could be overcome by an enemy's air assets, and did not in themselves provide any decisive advantage to the defender.

Only on 23 December 1941 did MacArthur turn to WPO-3, even though the plan had no official standing at the time. It was only a former, past plan, though fortunately one discarded recently enough that officers still remembered it. Failure to retain WPO-3 throughout 1941 meant that supplies were not stockpiled adequately on Bataan, that no permanent fortifications were built, and that fifteen days passed after the attack on Pearl Harbor before significant transport to the peninsula began. The consequent shortages meant disease casualties, misery, and premature disintegration of the combat line after 3 April. The operational plan was sound, but weak logistics partially undermined it.

The Bataan operational plan itself was not flawless, of course. Placing the Abucay-Mauban line astride Mt. Natib made it much easier for the position

to be turned. On the Pilar-Bagac line, the operational dispositions were better, but defensive tactics were not. Given the two-month lull in combat, and the Japanese predominance in artillery and air power, it behooved USFIP troops to move as much of their line as possible into trenches and tunnels. Food shortages would have made such labor difficult, but this alone would have shielded troops from the destruction of massive bombardment. This omission also was a major factor in the early dissolution of the American lines after 3 April.

The U.S. Bataan campaign was far from perfect. Still, by shrewd employment of its limited combat resources, American forces on Bataan achieved far more than military policy makers are normally entitled to expect.

*Dr. Thomas M. Huber is a historian at the Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.*

#### A Note on Sources

This paper is based on selected published and unpublished sources. The key unpublished materials include two manuscripts: Maj. Carlos J. Herrera, PA, "The Philippine Constabulary in the Battle of the

Philippines" (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1947); Maj. Alfredo M. Santos, PA, "The First Regular Division in the Battle of the Philippines" (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1947); and a report by Lt. Gen. Jonathan M. Wainwright, "Report of Operations of USAFFE and USFIP in the Philippines, 1941-1942" (Fort Sam Houston, Tex.: Headquarters, 4th Army, 1946)—including Annexes IV, V, XIII, and XIV.

The principal published sources include Louis Morton, *The Fall of the Philippines* (Washington: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1953); Mark S. Watson, *Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations, The War Department* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Historical Division, 1950); Lt. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton, *The Brereton Diaries* (New York: William Morrow, 1946); Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate, editors, *Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942*. Vol. 1, *The Army Air Forces in World War II* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948); and Lt. Gen. Jonathan M. Wainwright, *General Wainwright's Story* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1946).

### Editor's Journal

This issue of *Army History* focuses on the brave American and Filipino defense of Bataan and Corregidor during the early months of 1942. In addition, much of the present issue (delayed somewhat by software problems) is devoted to a comprehensive index of *Army History* issues through 1991.

Mr. Charles R. Anderson of our Field and International Division compiled this extensive index in the hope that our readers will retain it as a reference tool. S. Sgt. Christopher Choppelas of the 51st MHD initially conceived of the database format we used. My very special thanks to Mr. Judson ("Jeb") Bennett and Mr. John Birmingham of our Museum Division, who put together the final form of the index database during many "free" hours.

Henceforth, we will endeavor to produce an annual index, now that *Army History* has become more extensive in its size and coverage.

It is time to begin thinking about the Conference of Army Historians this coming June. The program for this professional gathering is printed on pp. 37-41. The conference has two major themes this year--The War in the Gulf and its Aftermath, and The U.S. Army in World War II: The Mediterranean and European Theaters, 1943-1945. A number of our friends and colleagues from overseas will be attending.

A registration form for the conference appears inside the back cover of this issue. Consider photocopying it or tearing it out as soon as possible. Please note that the deadline for registration is 20 April.

Arnold G. Fisch, Jr.

# The Chief's Corner

Harold W. Nelson

In this issue we devote some attention to the campaign in the Philippines, 8 December 1941-6 May 1942. Louis Morton's *The Fall of the Philippines* and his *Strategy and Command: The First Two Years* in the Center of Military History's United States Army in World War II are classics on the subject still worthy of careful attention. So too is a new book by Lt. Col. John W. Whitman, *Bataan: Our Last Ditch* (see the review in this issue). Most Americans know little about the defense of Bataan and Corregidor, but the story of those defenders deserves our consideration in these uncertain times.

Throughout the 1920s and 1930s U.S. strategy envisioned a mixed U.S.-Filipino force defending Manila harbor until the fleet could arrive with relief and reinforcement, holding out for as long as six months. The actual campaign reminds us of the problems encountered when strategy changes rapidly and is inadequately resourced.

In the summer of 1941 U.S. military strategists decided that long-range bombers based in the Philippines could deter or, if deterrence failed, destroy any Japanese invasion force that might attempt to seize key regions in Southeast Asia. The buildup of the B-17 fleet in the Philippines was incomplete when the Japanese struck on 8 December 1941, but General Douglas MacArthur had modified his defensive concepts in line with the promises of airpower and in keeping with his confidence in the Philippine Army. Now he hoped to defeat the Japanese invader on the beaches.

The Japanese air attack destroyed the B-17 fleet's ability to defeat an invasion force. The strength and speed of the Japanese landings were therefore greater than General MacArthur had estimated, and the invaders overran significant stores of supplies as the defenders fell back to defensive lines on the Bataan Peninsula. The combined U.S. and Philippine forces conducted a valiant defense in spite of being poorly trained, undermanned, inadequately equipped, and outgunned. Japanese sea and airpower isolated the defenders, limiting resupply to token amounts. Short rations, disease, and lack of supplies broke the defense of Bataan as surely as Japanese offensive action, and those same factors doomed the defenders of Corregidor.

The new Joint Pub 1, *Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces*, reminds us that "joint teams must be trained and ready prior to conflict," and "all our people

must be adept at working with others, both as fellow members of the U.S. Armed Forces and with allies and other foreign partners." Joint Pub 1 uses examples of successes in our military past to reinforce these important points, but they are just as clear in the tragic sacrifices in the Philippines in 1942. Soldiers of democratic nations are unsurpassed for valor, resoluteness, and initiative, but they risk entering the first battles of their nation's wars woefully unprepared. Here in Washington we are using these tragic lessons of history to help decisionmakers understand the requirement for a trained, ready Total Army of Reserve, National Guard, and Active components. General Sullivan is determined to "break the mold" of emasculating force reductions that have followed our victories in past wars. Historians throughout the Army must do what they can to contribute to this effort.

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The Center is in the process of moving to leased space in Franklin Court, a fine new building at 14th and "L" Street, NW. This move will put the Center on a site more accessible to our visitors, give all of our employees adequate work facilities, and bring Army Art back under the same roof with CMH. Our emergency move to Southeast Federal Center in 1990 was enormously disruptive, but our staff "soldiered on" in spite of the many difficulties. Looking back, the only benefit I can see from that unfortunate move was the establishment of a small history office in the Pentagon. We will retain that forward office, for it has proven its worth in war and peace. Our representatives who work there endure the crowded conditions common to Pentagon offices. It was easy to find volunteers for the duty while the rest of us were in Southeast Federal Center. Now it will be the challenge of quick-response action requirements that will attract historians to the Pentagon. The rest of us look forward to welcoming you into a more appropriate setting as we address your needs in museum or other history matters. We will publish new telephone and FAX numbers as soon as they are assigned. We hope to complete the move sometime in May. Our new address will be as follows:

**U. S. Army Center of Military History  
1099 14th Street, NW  
Washington, D.C. 20005-3402**

## The Archaic Archivist

*The focus of this Archaic Archivist is the Japanese attack on the Philippine Islands during World War II. Pertinent papers from the Archives Branch of the U.S. Army Military History Institute (MHI) at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013-5008, are noted. Readers should bear in mind that other manuscripts, printed material, and pictures on that subject are also available at the Institute.*

The American military presence in the Philippines from 1898 to 1941 is well documented in the Institute's archives. From the years immediately preceding World War II can be cited six boxes of papers (primarily newspaper clippings) of General Frank Parker, and four boxes of diaries, letters, and papers of General George Grunert, Commanding General of the Philippine Department, 1933-35 and 1940-41, respectively. Also available from that prewar decade is the Army War College Curricular Archives, reflecting the attention the Army senior educational institution was giving to the worsening international situation. Within those school files are various war game scenarios, including War Plan ORANGE for a possible conflict between the United States and Japan.

That possibility became a reality in December 1941, not only at Pearl Harbor, but also in the Philippines. The most important MHI manuscripts on the attack on America's western Pacific possessions are the "Louis Morton files" within the Office of the Chief of Military History (OCMH) Collection. Those files consist of nineteen boxes of personal recollections and diaries as well as official reports, orders, and documents from the U.S. Army, Army Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy, and the Philippine Commonwealth Armed Forces, which Doctor Morton gathered in the course of writing *The Fall of the Philippines* for the official series, *The United States Army in World War II*. After the box had been completed, OCMH (now the U.S. Army Center of Military History) transferred the Morton files to the Institute so that the primary source material itself could be available to researchers.

The Institute also has the personal papers of some prominent American generals who helped defend the Philippines: the diaries and papers of General Jonathan M. Wainwright, who succeeded General Douglas

MacArthur in overall command; the letters of Brig. Gen. Clinton A. Pierce, who commanded the 26th Cavalry Regiment (PS) and later the West Sector of Bataan; the report of Maj. Gen. George F. Moore, who commanded the harbor defenses of Manila Bay; and the memoirs of Brig. Gen. Lewis C. Beebe, who served as chief of staff of the U.S. Army Forces-Far East (USAFFE).

Among the junior officers on Luzon were several who rose to high command in postwar years. Preeminent among them was a field officer of the 57th Infantry Regiment (PS) named Harold K. Johnson. A quarter of a century later, General Johnson served as Army chief of staff during the Vietnam War. Another was Capt. (later Lt. Gen.) Alva R. Fitch, who served as a battalion commander in the 71st Philippine Field Artillery Regiment. In the mid-1960s he served as deputy director of the Defense Intelligence Agency. Lt. John M. Wright, also an artilleryman in the Philippines—with the 91st Coast Artillery Regiment (PS)—went on to command a division in Vietnam. Oral history transcripts are available by all three officers. In addition, Capt. (later Maj. Gen.) Chester L. Johnson of the 24th Field Artillery Regiment (PS) has donated two boxes containing some of his own papers as well as accounts by officers of other units in the USAFFE.

Also available are the diary and family letters of Col. William C. Braly, G-3 of the harbor defenses of Manila Bay. His diary is all the more celebrated for having been recovered on Corregidor by the American paratroopers who recaptured the island in February 1945, more than six months before the colonel himself was repatriated. Another important holding concerning Corregidor is the collection of primary source materials gathered by William and James Belote for their book, *Corregidor: The Saga of a Fortress*.

Additional perspectives on operations in Luzon may be found in the memoirs of Lt. Col. E. Carl Engelhart of the Philippine Department staff; the unabridged diary of Col. Richard C. Mallonee of the 21st Philippine Field Artillery Regiment; the papers of Maj. Charles E. N. Howard, Jr., of the 88th Field Artillery Regiment (PS); the log of Capt. William H. Owen of the 91st Coast Artillery Regiment (PS); the diary and memoirs of Lt. Col. James W. Callahan of the 45th

Infantry Regiment (PS); the diaries of Col. Philip T. Fry and Lt. Col. Dennis M. Moore, the papers of Capt. John E. Olson, and recollections of Col. Edmund J. Lilly—all of the 57th Infantry Regiment (PS); and the diary of Col. Charles S. Lawrence of the Tarlac Quartermaster Depot.

The first six months of the war in the southern islands also are strongly represented. One exceptionally important source consists of the personal letters and memoirs of Brig. Gen. Bradford G. Chynoweth, commander of the Visayan Force. Noteworthy as well are the family letters of Col. William H. Braddock, the surgeon of the Visayan-Mindanao Force; the diary of Col. Eugene H. Mitchell of the 61st Philippine Regiment; and a report by Col. Howard J. Edmands of the Cebu Military Police Regiment.

Throughout the islands, American and Filipino troops fought valiantly, but by April-May 1942, they were compelled to surrender. The end of organized resistance, however, did not mean the end of all hostilities. Allied soldiers who remained free or who escaped from captivity waged guerrilla warfare against the Japanese occupation forces. This partisan warfare is reflected in the papers of Brig. Gen. Russell W. Volkmann, the oral history of Col. Donald D. Blackburn, and the reminiscences of Capt. Mark M. Wohlfeld on Luzon; the box of memoirs, diaries, and messages that Lt. Col. Charles T. R. Bohannon gathered from fellow guerrilla officers on Luzon, Cebu, Palawan, and Mindoro; and the recollections of Col. Wendell W. Fertig, and of civilians Jacob Deisher and Royce Wendover on Mindanao. The oral history of Maj. Jay D. Vanderpool, moreover, recounts his insertion into northern Luzon in November 1944 to contact General Volkmann's guerrillas before the landing of General MacArthur's forces.

For most Americans on Bataan, Corregidor, and the southern islands, however, the months and years after the spring of 1942 were spent in prisoner of war camps in the Philippines and, for some, in Taiwan, Korea, and Manchuria. Many of the diaries, letters, memoirs, oral histories, and papers that are cited above continue to record the years of captivity. Colonel Olson's papers are especially strong in that regard, for he served as American adjutant for prisoners of war at Camp O'Donnell following the Bataan Death March. In addition to wartime documents, his collection includes twelve boxes of source material that he gathered for his book, *O'Donnell: Andersonville of the Pacific*. Colonel Braly's papers, moreover, include numerous notebooks which reflect how prisoners passed the time

to preserve their spirits. Additional prisoner of war holdings are the diary of Pvt. George F. Gallion, the papers of Dr. Eugene C. Jacobs, the memoirs of Maj. Dwight Gard and Capt. Harry H. Mittenenthal, and the oral history transcripts of members of the Army Medical Specialist Corps and of the Army Nurse Corps. The reminiscences of Richard Johnson recount the prison experiences of an Army civilian employee, and the Santo Tomas Prison Camp executive council minutes cover American and Filipino civilian internees in general.

From these varying perspectives of civilians, enlisted personnel, junior officers, future generals, and wartime generals, the defense of the Philippines, 1941-1942, and its aftermath, are well documented in the archives of the U.S. Army Military History Institute.

### Personal Memoir on Bataan Recommended

From time to time we like to keep our readers up to date about new privately published books on military history. One such volume for those interested in the Army's campaign on Bataan is *We Remember Bataan and Corregidor: The Story of the American & Filipino Defenders of Bataan and Corregidor and Their Captivity* by Lt. Col. Mariano Villarin, USAR (Ret.), 335 pages. Colonel Villarin participated in the Bataan campaign and he brings a Filipino perspective to American students of World War II in the Philippines. Villarin quotes extensively from several other participants, who find voice through this book. There are no new strategic or tactical bombshells in this account, but there are fascinating and very personal accounts of the Death March, the prison camps, and the tragedy of the *Oryoku Maru*. Interested readers can order this publication directly from Mariano Villarin, Box 5614, Long Beach, Calif. 90805-0614 for \$21.95, plus \$1.48 for California sales tax (\$3.00 more for overseas shipping).

A. G. Fisch, Jr.



# The Forgotten Reform The Institution of a System of Field Maneuvers in the U.S. Army, 1902-1912

Charles D. McKenna

In the aftermath of the Spanish-American War, the United States Army was substantially reformed at the instigation of Secretary of War Elihu Root. Central to the reform begun by Secretary Root was the creation of the general staff for the Army. For his role in this and other institutional changes carried out under his direction, Root deserves a prominent place in American military history. There was, however, an element in his program of reform which historians have either tended to ignore or to treat but fleetingly. This neglected element was his leadership in instituting a system of field maneuvers for the Army. (1)

When Root became secretary of war on 1 August 1899, few people expected him to initiate a program of substantial reform within the War Department. He had no experience in military matters. President McKinley wanted corporate attorney Root to administer the nation's newly won colonial empire. But the secretary was keenly intelligent, capable and thorough. Root realized that the failures of the War Department during the recently concluded war with Spain had been the result of an archaic system, not inept individuals. He concluded that to define and execute an efficient colonial policy he would have to reform and reorganize the principal executors of that policy, the War Department and the Army. (2)

The condition of the Army and War Department in 1898 provided ample justification for Root's conclusions. The department was afflicted by a number of serious deficiencies. The Regular Army, numbering just over 28,000 officers and men, was pitifully small and dispersed geographically. Participation in campaigns against the Indians honed the fighting skills of individual companies, but no system existed for training or evaluating the tactical proficiency of larger units such as brigades or divisions and the commanders who would lead them in the field. (3) The "free" security of the United States during the nineteenth century had allowed Congress to economize consistently in the area of military expenditures. (4) No plans existed for mobilization or campaign, nor did an agency exist whose duty it would be to draft them. Improvements in equipment and weaponry notwithstanding, insuffi-

cient quantities existed to equip an expanded army. The system of divided control and responsibility at the top in the War Department seemed to possess as much potential for chaos as for efficiency in a crisis. Finally, the militia system appeared unable to provide sufficient numbers of trained and reliable troops to reinforce the Regular Army in case of war. (5)

Victory in the war against Spain was tainted by the apparently incompetent way in which the whole affair had been waged. Fewer than one of six men mobilized ever left the United States. More than ten times as many men died of disease than from battle. Sanitary conditions in the assembly camps were abominable. The deployment of the expedition to Cuba was chaotic. Unprecedented coverage of the war by the press kept the headlines filled with stories of mismanagement and raised a popular outcry to discover and punish the culprits.

Much of the mismanagement of the war effort was attributed to Secretary of War Russell A. Alger. (6) He made an excellent scapegoat for the failure of United States military policy in general, and after numerous demands for his resignation, he finally resigned in 1899.

Secretary Root's first priority was to strengthen the Regular Army. In his first annual report, Root laid the groundwork and set the tone for his subsequent program of reform. The secretary cited two propositions as "fundamental":

First: That the object of having an army is to provide for war.

Second: That the regular establishment ... will probably never be by itself the whole machine with which any war will be fought. (7)

Root's first proposition implied the need for preparation before the outbreak of war, which would likely mean a larger army as well. Preparation consisted of four interrelated elements: first, "systematic study by responsible officers"; second, "the preparation of the material of war"; third, a process of selection "according to merit and effectiveness among the officers of the army"; finally, the "exercise and training ... of the Army in the movement of large bodies of troops ...

under conditions approaching as nearly as possible those ... in war." (8)

For the next three years the insurrection in the Philippines was the main preoccupation for the War Department and provided Root's principal rationale for increasing the size of the Regular Army. Root's assiduous campaigning was rewarded in February 1901 when Congress passed an act that fixed the Regular Army at 30 regiments of infantry, 15 regiments of cavalry, 1 corps of artillery, total strength between 60,000 and 100,000 men, and substituted periodic rotation of staff officers for permanent appointments. (9)

By the spring of 1902 Root had achieved substantial progress in other efforts to reform and reorganize the Army and the War Department. The Regular Army had been enlarged to deal with the Philippine insurrection. The establishment of the Army War College in 1901 offered great hope for improvements in military education. Measures were pending in Congress to establish a general staff and reform the militia. The secretary was then able to turn his attention to the last but certainly not the least element necessary for an army to prepare for war, a system of field maneuvers.

Though seemingly preoccupied with other matters, Root worked to bring about field maneuvers in the Army almost from the day he took office. In public statements and in official reports he argued for exercises involving large bodies of men in order to give officers experience "approximating as nearly as possible to that which will be encountered when the war machinery is required to do its proper work." (10) In 1901 Root secured an appropriation of \$10,000 for surveys to select four sites, possibly to establish them as permanent camps for the instruction of the Regular Army and National Guard. One of those four sites recommended, Fort Riley, Kansas, already belonged to the national government. The board reported in 1902 that the purchase of the remaining sites would facilitate the conduct of annual maneuvers for a large portion of regulars and organized militia. (11)

The submission of the board's report coincided with an improved international situation to create a favorable setting for the institution of field maneuvers. The situation in the Philippines became more stable in the summer of 1902, enabling the War Department to station more troops in the United States and in larger garrisons than had been quartered domestically since the war with Spain. Fort Riley seemed a logical site for obvious economic reasons. But beyond that, Root pointed out that the whole project would be consistent

with "General Sheridan's original idea of Fort Riley," where units could be placed in the field and given "as near an assimilation of actual service conditions as possible." (12)

In August 1902 the War Department charged the commanding general of the Department of Missouri, Maj. Gen. John C. Bates, with the responsibility of conducting these first maneuvers. Aside from the statements that it was a "fully determined policy" of the War Department to inaugurate maneuvers on an annual basis, a "lack of funds rather than disinclination to attend" would impact significantly on participation by the militia, and some other general instructions, Bates was left essentially on his own to undertake this project. (13) To design the program to be followed and the maneuvers to be conducted, Bates convened a board of officers headed by the man many American military men considered the final arbiter on military tactics and strategy, Col. Arthur L. Wagner. (14)

The body of experience upon which the board of officers could draw when planning the maneuvers at Fort Riley was not impressive. Limited exercises had been held at the Cavalry and Light Artillery School at Fort Riley as an outgrowth of a course in tactical exercises developed by Wagner and others at Fort Leavenworth. But by far the most imposing examples of how to conduct maneuvers were those offered by the professional armies of Europe. There, among other things, maneuvers promoted and encouraged mutual acquaintance and support among the branches of the service, helped to train commanders, and allowed men at all levels to demonstrate their fitness for command, or lack of it, provided opportunities to practice current tactics or evaluate new concepts. (15)

Officers planning maneuvers to be held at Fort Riley in September 1902 were conscious of the European example. Recognizing that the 36 square miles of the reservation did not allow sufficient territory and some participants did not possess the tactical proficiency to conduct maneuvers in the European style, the board chose to design separate exercises to be conducted daily by troops marching to Fort Riley from an established camp. (16) The board also drew up rules of procedure and methods for framing written orders to provide guidance for participant and umpire alike. After each exercise of the maneuver, units would receive performance assessments in assemblies, where all officers would hear and discuss comments of opposing commanders and the chief umpire. (17)

On 20 September 1902 approximately 6,000 regulars and militiamen began arriving at Camp Root, Fort

Riley, for the "first real Maneuver camp, in the full sense of the term, ... ever held in the United States." (18) Militia units did not arrive until 29 September and did not participate in combined exercises with the regulars until 2 October. (19) For the next five days the "Maneuver Division" engaged in a variety of activities, including the establishment of outposts, advance and rear guard, attack and defense of positions, and contact of opposing forces, the latter two actually employing opposing forces. By 9 October all units had departed Camp Root. (20)

Reactions to the maneuvers were generally favorable. Regrettably, the militia had arrived late and could not be organized into a brigade with regulars. Nevertheless, Colonel Wagner found the maneuvers beneficial for several reasons. They represented the first attempt to carry out a course of tactical exercises with a large command, and the first in which troops of the Regular Army and the National Guard were united in camp and field duties. Higher ranking officers had the opportunity to exercise command of larger bodies of troops "in tactics instead of drill." Junior officers led their troops in a variety of tactical situations. All officers gained from evaluations and commentary. (21) Additionally, the maneuvers demonstrated some tactical and organizational lessons and shortcomings, such as improper employment of artillery, faulty handling of messages, and careless use of cover and concealment. (22)

Outside observers echoed Wagner's views. One of Secretary Root's military advisers from Washington, Brig. Gen. William H. Carter, reported that the experience provided an opportunity for combined arms operations to a greater extent than at any time since the Civil War. He concluded that although expense precluded a large turnout by the National Guard, the success attending these maneuvers justified their continuation. (23) The War Department did just that. Acting as commander of the Maneuver Division and chief umpire respectively, Bates and Wagner conducted maneuvers in the fall of 1903 at Fort Riley and at West Point, Kentucky, near Louisville, both similar to those held at Fort Riley in 1902. (24)

Commentary on the maneuvers of 1902 and 1903 opened up the question of proper conduct of future maneuvers. Some officers accepted the format of a camp of instruction with maneuvers conducted as part of a variety of activities. Others wanted European style, full-scale, continuous maneuvers with opposing forces. The latter group saw the encampments of 1902 and 1903 as a demonstration only of what was possible

given current limitations. Men like Bates and Wagner argued that the ideal maneuver would consist of a strategic operation of two large opposing forces closing on one another from long distances. Tactical engagements would then occur incident to an overall plan of operations. Observers from the newly created general staff recommended a novel approach to maneuvers in 1904 that might provide a step in the direction of the ideal. Men like Capt. Benjamin Alford and Capt. Peyton C. March argued that two separate camps should be maintained from which opposing forces could operate against one another. Wagner went so far as to recommend the establishment of a provisional corps headquarters at a third location to control the movements of the two divisions. (25) The commander of the Atlantic Division, Maj. Gen. Henry C. Corbin, was convinced that he could employ this technique effectively in 1904.

Corbin estimated that with an appropriation of \$1 million he could hold maneuvers for approximately 27,000 officers and men, which would be the largest encampment ever held in the United States. (26) Congress appropriated that amount in April, and after a thorough search, Corbin selected an area near Manassas, Virginia, for the proposed maneuvers. Corbin reviewed what he called the "fair criticism" of the maneuvers of the previous two years, namely occupation of the same camp by opposing forces with an attendant lack of security "in the presence of the enemy," and a lack of initiative by commanders. Corbin proposed to remedy this situation by establishing his corps headquarters at Gainsville between divisions camped at Thoroughfare and Bull Run. The camps were to be continuously guarded and commanders were allowed to employ "unlimited initiative" in tactical situations, once set in motion by Corbin. (27)

By 4 September all participants had arrived at their camps. Reflecting the impact of the Dick Militia Act of 1903, which subsidized participation in field maneuvers with regulars, more than four-fifths of the 26,000 troops assembled were National Guardsmen from seventeen states. The maneuvers were governed by new rules, written by Capt. Joseph T. Dickman of the general staff. Following a day of prescribed drills, the first of two extended maneuvers began on 6 September, followed by a second on the 8th. Under the watchful eyes of Colonel Wagner, again acting as chief umpire, and his fifty assistants, the maneuvers involved variations of a situation with one army operating from a base below Washington, D.C., while the other worked from the Shenandoah Valley. Following

a review before the chief of staff on 10 September, the provisional corps disbanded. (28)

Reactions to the maneuvers were mixed. Many were impressed at the sanitary conditions and administrative efficiency of the camps. New equipment, such as the automobile, was tested under field conditions. But the scope of the maneuvers had placed unreasonable demands upon the umpires, still too few in number to allow for adequate coverage of all activities. The uneven state of militia training also adversely affected the conduct of the maneuvers. Some officers, particularly Brig. Gen. Tasker H. Bliss, a brigade commander during the encampment, criticized Corbin's apparent overemphasis on initiative. Bliss pointed out that everyone believed that full and unrestrained initiative was left to commanders, regardless of conditions imposed, a ludicrous situation nonexistent in war. (29) Additionally, continuous exercises did not allow for assemblies and discussion of the maneuvers, as in 1902 and 1903. (30) These developments, coupled with an anticipated expenditure of \$1.25 million for maneuvers in 1905, aroused hostility among key congressmen, who questioned whether taxpayers were getting an adequate return for their investment. In the face of such pressure, the War Department simply withdrew the estimate, and no funds were appropriated for maneuvers in 1905. (31)

By the end of 1905 Secretary of War Taft lamented the absence of maneuvers as "perhaps the most radical defect in our present system of military training." (32) On 26 December 1905, Capt. Grote Hutcheson of the general staff submitted a possible solution to the problem by submitting a plan designed to be frugal and instructive for the National Guard. To minimize cost, Hutcheson recommended that camps be held either on land owned by the government or on a military reservation; that as far as practicable, troops be assembled within their own departments, regulars for the whole period of the encampment, selected militia units joining them for shorter periods; that regulars stationed within a prescribed distance from the encampment (later set at approximately 200 miles for infantry and 300 miles for cavalry) should march to and from the sites and conduct exercises incident to their marches. (33) Hutcheson's proposal received enthusiastic support all the way to Theodore Roosevelt's "bully pulpit" at the White House, and some months later Congress approved the appropriation necessary to carry out this plan. (34)

Encampments conducted under these conditions followed at seven locations in 1906 and at eight sites in

1908. Each year approximately 20,000 regulars and over 40,000 militia participated. The resumption of maneuvers allowed senior officers to command forces of all arms. Participants tested new equipment, such as wireless telegraphy, and new concepts such as the Field Service Regulations and the uses of machine gun platoons and companies. The reintroduction of maneuvers coincided with the Army's introduction of a system of tactical training for units at their home stations, stimulating lively discussion within the professional journals on the role of maneuvers within such a system.

In late summer 1909 Maj. Gen. Leonard Wood, commander of the Department of the East, converted a routine exercise in coast defense into a maneuver more closely resembling the ideal than any yet conducted. Wood envisioned a continuously developing tactical situation in which the opposing forces operated against one another based on initial guidelines and information developed by the forces themselves. To that end, Wood employed about 11,000 regulars and militia in a 2,000-square-mile area south of Boston, Massachusetts. One force, commanded by General Bliss, attacked while the other defended the city. Troop inexperience and ammunition shortages reduced the effectiveness of the maneuver. However, there seemed little doubt that the 1909 experience was more instructive than that at Manassas in 1904, and at approximately one-seventh the cost. (35) By this time, the War Department had begun planning ten encampments for 1910, all similar to those of 1906 and 1908, but enlarged to accommodate 37,000 regulars and 70,000 militia. (36)

While the maneuvers had benefited increasing numbers of troops, Bliss questioned their realism. He argued that advance publication of orders allowed commanders to establish what amounted to semipermanent installations, which afforded little more training than that which took place at their permanent stations. As a remedy, Bliss recommended mobilizing two forces some distance apart, then giving one force the mission of repulsing the other and capturing an objective. The combined force would then participate in additional exercises. (37) Under the extant system, this concept would not be implemented until 1912. But turmoil along the Mexican border gave the Army the opportunity to mobilize and rapidly concentrate a large body of troops.

The fiasco that was the 1911 Maneuver Division mobilization around San Antonio, Texas, is familiar to historians of the twentieth century Army. Less familiar

is the fact that the mobilization and maneuvers stimulated a reappraisal of the tactical organization of the combined arms division. (38)

With the experience of the Maneuver Division behind it, the general staff recommended what it called "maneuver campaigns." Like the maneuvers near Boston in 1909, and similar to the suggestions of Wagner and Bliss, these campaigns would involve the defense by one force of a site, normally a major city, against assault by the other. Unlike the joint Regular Army/National Guard camps where individual exercises were held at specified times, the campaigns would take place as unscheduled episodes of an evolving situation from first day to last. (39) Three of these campaigns took place during the summer of 1912. Described as "an entirely new departure" from previous maneuvers, the campaigns won approval from participant and observer alike. (40)

Two other significant events occurred during the summer of 1912. A provisional regiment of infantry was organized at Dubuque, Iowa, to provide data for the general staff's continuing study of regimental organization, equipment, and the applicability of infantry drill regulations. The regiment marched under tactical conditions to the maneuver camp at Sparta, Wisconsin, and participated in maneuvers there. The report based on the regiment's experience contained recommendations affecting all phases of the organization, tactics, equipment, and transport of the regiment. (41) Also that summer the War Department released its report on the organization of the land forces of the United States. This report reflected much of the Army's recent experience, including the 1911 mobilization in Texas, and

formulated the broad outlines of a comprehensive military policy for the first time since Emory Upton's attempt of the late nineteenth century. (42)

Maneuvers had come about through a gradual evolution from small post exercises to combined exercises of larger units. However, only when Elihu Root strongly advocated combined field maneuvers for the Regular Army and the militia on a recurring basis did this concept receive consistent support. Root had sold Congress on the idea of maneuvers to give senior officers the opportunity to command large bodies of troops under simulated conditions of war. But not long after maneuvers began, the War Department realized that they offered the potential for a good deal more. The Army's early field maneuvers were actually camps of instruction. The adoption of this format involved, however, a conscious decision not to imitate European-style maneuvers in order to conduct the kind of activities of which the U.S. Army at that time was capable.

Despite improvements in training and maneuvers, in 1912 the Army remained small, geographically dispersed, and lacking in tactical organization. What progress had been made was largely conceptual. Imaginative soldiers had still been able to create conditions simulating field service in war that provided a forum for the conduct of a wide variety of activities. What is remarkable is not that they achieved so little, but that they achieved so much.

*Lt. Col. Charles D. McKenna is associate professor, Department of History, U.S. Military Academy, West Point, New York.*

## Notes

1. A typical view of the subject of field maneuvers during the years following the Spanish-American War is that expressed in a recent official Army history. The conclusion of that study was that the military manpower situation prior to the mid-1930s was such as to preclude large-unit training exercises and maneuvers, so none were held. Jean R. Moeck, *A History of Large-Scale Army Maneuvers in the United States, 1935-1964* (Fort Monroe, Virginia: U.S. Continental Army Command, 1969), pp. 1-3; more recently, Richard L. Watson, Jr., *The Development of National Power, The United States 1900-1919* (Boston: Houghton-

Mifflin Company, 1976), p. 119, has argued that "Insufficient funds prevented regular maneuvers, although the need was recognized."

2. Phillip C. Jessup, *Elihu Root*, 2 vols. (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1938) 1:210-15.

3. For example, while Col. John N. Andrews' 12th Infantry garrisoned only Fort Niobrara, Nebraska, Col. John C. Bates' 2d Infantry was not so fortunate. Bates had his headquarters and four companies at Fort Keough, Montana. Two other companies garrisoned Fort Harrison, Montana, and two more companies garrisoned Fort Yeats, North Dakota. *The Army and*

*Navy Journal*, 26 February 1898, p. 479. Robert M. Utley, *Frontier Regulars: The United States Army and the Indian, 1866-1891* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1973), p. 25; Russell F. Weigley, *History of the United States Army* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1967), p. 290.

4. C. Vann Woodward, "The Age of Reinterpretation," *American Historical Review* 66, no. 1 (October 1960): 4-7.

5. Charles D. Rhodes, "The Experiences of Our Army Since the Outbreak of the War with Spain," *Journal of the Military Service Institution* 36, no. 134 (March-April 1905): 200-10 (hereafter cited as *JMSI*).

6. Alger was another example of an appointee selected more for his political connections than his administrative ability. He was a former successful businessman and governor of Michigan. He achieved some political repute in the Midwest, which helped set the stage for his appointment. Louis A. Cantor, "The Creation of the Modern National Guard: The Dick Militia Act of 1903" (Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1963), p. 124. See also *Report of the Commission Appointed by the President to Investigate the Conduct of the War Department in the War with Spain*, 8 vols., Senate Doc. no. 221, 56th Cong., 1st sess., 1900, 1: 115; Barrie E. Zais, "President McKinley's Dodge Commission: A Prelude to Army Reform, 1898-1899" (Master's thesis, Duke University, 1974), pp. 39-41, 143, 144.

7. U.S. War Department, *Report of the Secretary of War 1897*, pp. 45-46 (hereafter cited as *RSW*).

8. *Ibid.*, pp. 48-49.

9. *U.S. Statutes at Large* 31, 2 February 1901, pp. 748-58; among Root's influential contacts was the powerful editor of *The Army and Navy Journal*, William Conant Church, who supported this measure and did not hesitate to use his paper to speak out on the subject. See Donald N. Bigelow, *William Conant Church and The Army and Navy Journal* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1952). This measure finally institutionalized the three battalion/squadron, twelve company/troop regiment for the infantry and cavalry.

10. *RSW*, 1899, pp. 48-49.

11. By October 1902, 48,507 regulars were stationed in the U.S. compared to 22,433 in the Philippines and approximately 2,300 scattered elsewhere overseas; H.O.S. Heistand, "Requirements of a Maneuver Site and the Measures Necessary to Secure the Same," *JMSI* 35, no. 132 (November-December 1904): 470.

12. U.S. Congress, House, *Hearings Before the Committee on Military Affairs of the House of Representatives on the Bill Making Appropriation for the Support of the Army for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1903*, 9 January 1902, p. 21.

13. Ltr, Carter to Bates, 18 August 1902, Doc. no. 449672, Record Group 94, National Archives; on 11 July the adjutant general sent letters to all state and territorial governors explaining the intent to conduct maneuvers in September, extending invitations to attend, and expressing regret for the Department of the Army's inability to defray any expenses for the militia. Citing lack of funds, the replies were overwhelmingly negative.

14. Ltr, Bates to adjutant general, 23 August 1902, Doc. no. 449672, RG 94. Other members of the board were Col. Camillo C. Carr, 4th Cavalry; Maj. E. C. McClelland, assistant adjutant general; Capt. Horace M. Reeve, 17th Infantry, aide-de-camp and recorder.

15. U.S. War Department, Adjutant General's Office, *The Autumn Maneuvers of 1894, 1896*, Military Intelligence Division no. 6 (1895), no. 15 (1897). Some Military Intelligence Division sources included foreign publications such as the *Revue Militaire de l'Etranger*, *London Times*, *Broad Arrow*, *Berliner Post* and *Revue Militaire Suisse*.

16. *Proceedings of the Board of Officers Convened to Plan the Maneuvers at Fort Riley, 4 September 1902*, Doc. no. 449672, RG 94.

17. Col. Arthur L. Wagner, "The Fort Riley Maneuvers," *JMSI* 32, no. 121 (January 1903): 74-5. Wagner considered the assembly "one of the most valuable features of the encampment."

18. Wagner, "Combined Maneuvers of the Regular Army and Organized Militia," *JMSI* 36, no. 133 (January-February 1905): 65; GO 1, 20 September 1902, officially established the "Maneuver Division, Camp Root, Fort Riley Reservation, Kansas."

19. Units of the Regular Army included 3 infantry regiments, 3 cavalry squadrons, 4 field artillery batteries, 1 engineer battalion, and Signal Corps and Hospital Corps detachments. The militia units included a provisional battalion from Colorado, and two infantry regiments and two field artillery batteries from Kansas.

20. *Wagner Report*, Fort Riley, 9 October 1902, pp. 49-71; GO 4, sub: Maneuver Division, 20 September 1902.

21. Wagner, "Fort Riley Maneuvers," *JMSI*, pp. 70, 92-93.

22. Brig Gen William H. Carter, Report of Observations Made During Army Maneuvers at Fort Riley,

Kansas, 1902, 23 October 1902, pp. 1-6, Doc. no. 494490, RG 94.

23. *Ibid.*, pp. 5-6.

24. Maj Gen John C. Bates, Report of Maneuvers Held at Fort Riley, Kansas from October 15 to October 30, Inclusive, 1903, 20 November 1903, pp. 1-2, Doc. no. 511453, RG 94; Report of Arthur L. Wagner, Assistant Adjutant General, United States Army, Chief Umpire, Maneuver Division, Camp Young, West Point, Kentucky, 16 October 1903, pp. 1-2. Regulars numbered 2,800 at West Point; National Guard, 7,400. At Fort Riley the figures were 5,500 regulars and 4,000 militia.

25. Wagner, "Combined Maneuvers," *JMSI*, p. 86; Alfred C. Sharpe, "Our Autumn Maneuvers," *JMSI* 34, no. 127 (January-February 1904): 79-83; Report of General Staff Observers to the Chief of Staff, General Staff Correspondence 1903-1906, RG 165. The observers were Maj. E.C. McClelland, himself a planner for the 1902 maneuvers, and Capts. Benjamin Alford and Peyton C. March. They argued that a major objective should be to get away from what they called "7 to 5 maneuvers," meaning one maneuver beginning and ending the same day.

26. Ltrs. Moss to adjutant general, 30 November 1903 and 12 January 1904; Corbin to adjutant general, 28 January 1904; Chaffee to Corbin, 8 April 1904; all in Doc. no. 510690, RG 94. Corbin figured the cost of the previous two encampments at \$50 per man. Reducing this by 25 percent based on the choice of a central location gave Corbin his estimate.

27. Ltr. Corbin to military secretary, 27 May 1904, Doc. no. 529823, RG 94.

28. The scope of the encampment and its proximity to Washington attracted many visitors. General Chaffee and Secretary of the Navy Morton attended the review on 10 September; 7 foreign military attaches and 6 state governors also visited the maneuvers.

29. Tasker H. Bliss, Memorandum on Second Maneuver Problem (September 8-9, 1904) at Manassas, 5 December 1904, pp. 5-10, Doc. no. 991366, RG 94.

30. Report of the Third Division, GS, on the Combined Maneuvers of the Regular Army and Organized Militia at Manassas, Virginia, 11 March 1905, Doc. no. 993509, RG 94. Two other encampments were held in

1904, both in the Pacific Division. However, fewer than 9,500 troops were involved in these maneuvers, and they were overshadowed by those at Manassas.

31. U.S. Congress, Senate, *Hearings Before the Committee on Military Affairs of the Senate on the Bill Making Appropriation for the Support of the Army for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1906*, 23 January 1905, p. 15.

32. U.S. War Department, *Annual Reports, 1905*, I, pp. 30-33. Memorandum for the chief of staff, 26 December 1905, Doc. no. 1094369, RG 94.

34. U.S. War Department, GO 115, 20 June 1906, published the text of the *Army Appropriation Act of 12 June 1906*. Congress appropriated \$700,000 for the maneuvers.

35. Maj Gen Leonard Wood, Report of the Commanding General, Department of the East on the Field Exercises Held in Massachusetts, August 14-21, 1909.

36. U.S. War Department, GO 63, 15 April 1910.

37. Bliss, quoted in U.S. War Department, *Reports on Camps of Instruction, 1910*, III-1: 6-7.

38. Ltr. Carter to Wood, 13 June 1911, Box 53, General Correspondence, Wood Mss.; Ltr. Carter to adjutant general, 5 July 1911, File 6805-1, WCD, GS, RG 165.

39. Report, WCD, GS, Plans for the Joint Maneuvers of the Regular Army and the Organized Militia, for the Year 1912, 9 January 1912, File 8154, RG 165.

40. Report of Brigadier General Tasker H. Bliss, U.S. Army, Commander of Maneuvers and Chief Umpire, Connecticut Maneuver Campaign, August 10-12, 1912, n.d., U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.

41. Brig Gen R.D. Potts, Report of Provisional Regiment Organized in Central Division in June 1912, 22 August 1912, File 7289, WCD, GS, RG 165.

42. U.S. War Department, *A Report on the Organization of the Land Forces of the United States* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1912). This report contained a variety of recommendations, including one for a permanent increase in the size of tactical units and another for a permanent reconcentration for tactical organization and administration adapted to current geographic dispositions.

## 1942

### January - March

1 Jan - The United Nations is formed as twenty-six nations at war with the Axis sign a declaration in which each pledges cooperation with the others in committing its military or economic resources against the nations of the Tripartite Pact. Each government also agrees not to make a separate peace with the Axis Powers.

2 Jan - Following American and Filipino withdrawal from Manila, Japanese forces occupy the city.

3 Jan - Thirteen Americans are killed as Corregidor is subjected to five hours of sustained Japanese aerial bombardment.

5 Jan - U.S. and Filipino troops establish the Layac line along the base of the Bataan Peninsula to allow withdrawal of forces through the Layac junction, which channels all roads into the peninsula.

6 Jan - The Japanese attack the overextended Layac line, forcing a withdrawal which is completed on 7 January.

7 Jan - Siege of the Bataan Peninsula begins.  
- President Franklin D. Roosevelt submits a budget for fiscal 1943 of over \$59 billion.

10 Jan - The Japanese air drop their first surrender demand to U.S. and Filipino troops defending the Bataan Peninsula.

11 Jan - A Japanese submarine scores a torpedo hit on the USS *Saratoga* 500 miles southwest of Oahu, but the carrier is not damaged.

12 Jan - At Abucay, Bataan, 2d Lt. Alexander R. Nininger, 57th Infantry, Philippine Scouts, singlehandedly assaults a group of enemy soldiers in trees and foxholes who had stopped his outfit's counterattack. In fierce hand-to-hand combat he forced his way into the enemy position and killed several of the enemy before being killed himself. For his actions Lieutenant Nininger was awarded the first Medal of Honor of the war.

14 Jan - The Arcadia Conference, called to discuss British-U.S. war strategy, ends in Washington, D.C. The two nations agree that the defeat of Germany is to be the immediate and primary goal, after which all Allied power can be focused against Japan. In addition it is determined that an operation (GYMNAST) will be organized to occupy French North Africa. A decision is also made to create the Combined Chiefs of Staff to oversee the Anglo-American war effort.

16 Jan - A Japanese breakthrough on the western flank jeopardizes the entire defensive line on Bataan.

19 Jan - President Roosevelt asks Congress for a supplemental appropriation of \$28.5 billion for war expenses, including over \$12.5 billion for the Army.

23 Jan - After several failed attempts to restore the western flank, the Bataan defense line begins a withdrawal south to the Pilar-Bagac road.

- Australian Army Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Francis M. Forde appeals to the United States and to Britain for emergency military aid.

24 Jan - A special commission (the Roberts Commission) charged with investigating the attack on Pearl Harbor reports that the disaster was due to the "dereliction of duty" of Navy and Army commanders Rear Adm. Husband E. Kimmel and Lt. Gen. Walter C. Short.

- In the Battle of Makassar Strait, the first major naval battle of the war, four U.S. destroyers sink four Japanese transports.

25 Jan - Thailand declares war on the United States and Britain.

26 Jan - The first convoy of U.S. troops in Europe arrives in Northern Ireland.

- U.S. and Filipino forces complete the withdrawal to the final defense line behind the Pilar-Bagac road.

29 Jan - U.S. forces begin arriving in the Fiji Islands.

6 Feb - The Combined Chiefs of Staff organization is established.

7 Feb - Defenders on Bataan open counterattack,



# Chronology

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encircling some Japanese and compelling the main enemy forces to withdraw northward to regroup.

11 Feb - The U.S. grants China a \$500 million loan.

15 Feb - The 6th Armored Division is constituted and its headquarters activated at Fort Knox, Kentucky.

17 Feb - U.S. soldiers arrive in Bora Bora.

19 Feb - Brig. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower is assigned as chief of the War Plans Division.

20 Feb - The U.S. grants the Soviet Union a loan of \$1 billion.

23 Feb - President Roosevelt orders General MacArthur to leave the Philippines.

23 Feb - In the first attack of the war on the U.S. mainland, a Japanese submarine fires on the Bankline Oil Refinery near Santa Barbara, California, causing minimal damage.

- The 93d Infantry Division is constituted.

26 Feb - A Japanese air attack sinks the U.S. carrier *Langley* which was bound for Java. The thirty-two fighters on board are lost.

27 Feb - The creation of the Mexican-U.S. Defense Commission is authorized by President Roosevelt.

27 Feb-1 Mar - The Battle of the Java Sea is a defeat for Allied naval forces, which lose thirteen warships.

1 Mar - The 7th Armored Division is constituted and its headquarters activated at Camp Polk, Louisiana.

- The Japanese launch a ground assault on Java. Twelve days later the 2d Bn, 131st Field Artillery, operating under the Royal Netherlands Army, is surrendered to the *Japanese 16th Army*. The unit, known as the "Lost Battalion," is not heard from again until 300 of its original 541 men are liberated at the end of the war.

4 Mar - Headquarters, American Army Forces, China, Burma, and India is established at Chungking.

10 Mar - Lend-Lease aid is made available to Iran.

11 Mar - General MacArthur leaves Corregidor for Mindanao, vowing to the Filipinos, "I shall return."

12 Mar - A U.S. Army task force of 17,500 men arrives in New Caledonia.

13 Mar - First U.S. troops (AAF) in China-Burma-India Theater arrive at Karachi.

14 Mar - The Joint Chiefs of Staff decide to maintain a defensive posture and current troop strength in the Pacific while massing troops in the U.K. for the offensive against Germany.

- The first U.S. troops arrive in Australia.

17 Mar - Newly appointed as supreme commander of Allied forces in the southwest Pacific, MacArthur reaches Australia from Mindanao.

- The third draft drawing is held.

24 Mar - Combined Chiefs of Staff establish the Pacific Theater as an area of U.S. responsibility.

- The Japanese commence a fierce aerial and artillery bombardment of Bataan in the face of a determined stand by U.S. and Filipino troops there. Corregidor is also heavily bombed.

27 Mar - In the "Plan for Operations in Northwest Europe" the War Plans Division foresees a small-scale emergency operation in autumn 1942 (SLEDGEHAMMER) to assist Soviet forces if they begin to falter seriously or, if SLEDGEHAMMER is not necessary, the main British-American invasion (ROUNDUP) in spring 1943.

30 Mar - A new command, the Southwest Pacific Area, is delineated with General Douglas MacArthur in command. The new command replaces the Australian-British-Dutch-American Command and includes Australia, Bismarck Archipelago, New Guinea, Philippines, Solomons, and most of the Netherlands East Indies.

-The first U.S. troops arrive at Ascension Island to construct an airstrip.

*This chronology is the latest in our series of World War II chronologies compiled by Mr. Edward N. Bedessem.*

# Fredericksburg/Chancellorsville Staff Ride Guide

Ted Ballard

The campaigns of Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, Virginia, feature several rarities and firsts of the Civil War, including river assault, urban warfare, night combat, and trench fighting.

Both campaigns offer case studies in the application of the principles of war and unit cohesion. A staff ride to either battlefield, therefore, provides valuable object lessons from the past for present-day Army leadership.

The area in and around Fredericksburg was the setting for four major battles of the Civil War. In addition to Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, the Wilderness and Spotsylvania battlefields are included in the Fredericksburg/Spotsylvania National Military Park. The information which follows is intended to assist interested individuals in designing and leading a Chancellorsville or Fredericksburg staff ride. A future issue of *Army History* will contain information concerning the Wilderness and Spotsylvania battlefields.

A publication to assist in organizing the project is *The Staff Ride*, by William G. Robertson, published by the U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington. This booklet provides guidance for organizing a staff ride, lists various functions (e.g., site selection, study phases) associated with staff riding, and establishes flexible standards for a successful exercise. Copies are available to Army account holders from the U.S. Army Publications Center, 2800 Eastern Boulevard, Baltimore MD 21220-2896. The order number is CMH publication 70-21.

Another helpful publication is *The U.S. Army War College Guide to the Battles of Chancellorsville and Fredericksburg*, by Jay Luvaas and Harold W. Nelson. The paperback should be available through commercial bookstores at a cost of \$8.95 each.

A variety of publications concerning the battlefield are available for purchase at visitor centers located in the Fredericksburg/Spotsylvania National Military Park. The Fredericksburg Battlefield Visitor Center is located at 1013 Lafayette Boulevard, Fredericksburg. The telephone number is (703) 373-6122. The Chancellorsville Visitor Center is located ten miles west of Fredericksburg, on Va. Route 3. The telephone number is (703) 786-2880. Chatham, an eighteenth century home that served as headquarters

for various Union generals, is part of the National Park Service battlefield tour and contains displays and publications. The telephone number is (703) 373-4461. These locations are open seven days a week, 0800 to 1700, except Thanksgiving, Christmas, and New Year's Day. Additional information regarding Fredericksburg/Spotsylvania National Military Park is available from the Superintendent, P.O. Box 679, Fredericksburg, Va. 22404.

Modern 1:24,000 scale topographical maps of the battlefield area are available for sale from the U.S. Geological Survey, Denver, Colo. 80225 or Reston, Va. 22092. The cost is \$2.50 per map. Chancellorsville, Salem Church, Fredericksburg, and Guinea, Virginia, quadrangles cover the Chancellorsville battle, the Fredericksburg and Guinea quadrangles cover the Battle of Fredericksburg.

Sets of five black and white National Park Service maps showing detailed troop dispositions at either Fredericksburg or Chancellorsville are available from the Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville visitor centers. The cost is \$6.00 per set.

A few published sources of information that might be helpful in developing a Fredericksburg or Chancellorsville staff ride are listed below. Copies of these publications should be available from commercial bookstores or, if out of print, through interlibrary loan:

Bigelow, John, Jr. *The Campaign of Chancellorsville: A Strategic and Tactical Study*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1910.

Commager, Henry Steele, ed. *The Blue and the Gray: The Story of the Civil War as Told by Participants*. Volume I. New York: Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1950. pp. 228-266.

Dowdey, Clifford, ed. *The Wartime Papers of R. E. Lee*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1961. pp. 324-472.

Griess, Thomas E., ed. *The American Civil War*. New Jersey: Avery Publishing Group, Inc., 1987. pp. 121-143.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Atlas for the American Civil War*. New Jersey: Avery Publishing Group, 1986. Maps 24-32.

Henderson, George Francis Robert. *The Campaign of Fredericksburg, November-December, 1862*. London: Chatham, Gale, and Polden, 1891.

Herbert, Walter H. *Fighting Joe Hooker*. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1944.

Johnson, Robert U., and Buel, Clarence, editors. *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*. Grant Lee Edition, vol. 3, part 1. New York: The Century Company, 1884, 1888. Fredericksburg, pp.70-147, Chancellorsville, pp. 152-243.

Longstreet, James. *From Manassas to Appomattox*. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1896. (Fredericksburg, pp. 297-321).

Stackpole, Edward J. *Chancellorsville, Lee's Greatest Battle*. Harrisburg: Military Service Publishing Company, 1958.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Drama on the Rappahannock: The Fredericksburg Campaign*. Harrisburg: Military Service Publishing Company, 1957.

U.S. War Department. *War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1889. Fredericksburg, Series 1, vol. 21 and Chancellorsville, Series 1, vol. 25, parts 1 and 2.

Larry A. ("Ted") Ballard is a historian in the Center's Field and International Division, with a special interest in the Civil War.

#### Award Winning Army Museum

The U. S. Army Air Defense Artillery Museum, Fort Bliss, Texas, has received a Texas Historical Commission Museum Award for the exhibit, "Their Finest Hour--The Battle of Britain." This recognition (for outstanding achievement in exhibits during 1990) was announced last summer--one of six such awards the commission awarded to Texas museums. This was the fifth one the Fort Bliss Museum Division has received from the Texas Historical Commission.

The winning exhibit, commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the Battle of Britain, was described in the Fall 1991 issue (No. #20) of *Army History*.

#### Military Review 1991 Writing Contest Winners

The commandant of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College has announced the winners of the 1991 *Military Review* writing contest. The contest theme was "The Army in American Society." The winners:

1st Place (\$500) "Blacks, the Army and America: Opportunity and Ultimate Cost," by Maj. Rainier H. Spencer. Major Spencer is a philosophy instructor at the United States Military Academy, West Point, New York.

2d Place (\$200) "Media Access to the Battlefield in the New Age of Information," by Capt. James B. Brown. Captain Brown is a west European foreign area officer, currently attending the Austrian General Staff Course in Vienna, Austria.

3d Place (\$100) "The Future of Women in the Army," by Lt.Col. Robert L. Maginnis. Colonel Maginnis teaches inquiries and investigations at the Inspector General School, Fort Belvoir, Virginia.

The winning essays will appear in *Military Review* in the spring and summer of 1992.

#### 1992 Military Review Contest Rules

Entries on the topic "The U.S. Army in Joint, Combined, and Coalition Warfare" will be accepted through 1 July 1992 for this year's contest. The author of the winning manuscript will receive a \$500 cash award. Second and third place winners will receive \$200 and \$100, respectively. The winning manuscript will be published in the fall issue of *Military Review*. All other entries also will be considered for publication.

Possible subjects include, but are not limited to, current and future roles and missions, doctrine, historical perspectives, service relationships, recent operational lessons, and education and training. The unifying theme should be consideration of current and future joint, combined, and coalition warfighting capabilities. Entries will be judged for relevance to current Army needs, research, and scholarship.

Manuscripts must be original, not previously offered elsewhere for publication, between 2,000 and 2,500 words typed double-spaced. A writer's guide is available upon request. Send entries to: *Military Review*, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Funston Hall, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6910.

## Focus on the Field

**Military History Office  
U.S. Army, Europe, and Seventh Army  
Bruce Siemon, Chief**

The history of history in the U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR), goes back almost fifty years and begins with a tragedy.

On 3 February 1943 Lt. Gen. Frank M. Andrews assumed command of the European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army (ETOUSA), but only three months later, on 3 May, he was killed in an airplane crash. Despite his untimely death, General Andrews had at least one lasting impact on the command that is known today as USAREUR. Clearly, General Andrews had a sense of history, for in one of his earliest actions, on 5 April, he requested that the War Department assign to ETOUSA Col. William A. Ganoë, a former professor of military science and tactics at the University of Michigan, to "start an historical record of ETO."

Thus was the USAREUR historical program born.

When Colonel Ganoë reached London on 8 May 1943, he discovered that no one had any clear idea of what General Andrews had intended. No guidance had been prepared; no plans, taskings, or mission statements were in place; indeed, there was not even a War Department-level historical agency that might provide Ganoë suggestions or guidance. (It was not until August 1943 that a Historical Branch was created as a subelement of the Intelligence Division of the War Department General Staff.) As a result, Colonel Ganoë had the distinct advantage of being free to create his own program, and he made the most of that license.

In the spring of 1943 the ETOUSA headquarters was in the throes of a reorganization—a phenomenon familiar to anyone who has spent time in military service. The Censorship and Information Section to which Ganoë had been assigned was discontinued, and a new History Section established and assigned to the Public Relations Section. On 28 June, however, the History Section was transferred to the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3—certainly a more advantageous staff alignment.

In the meantime, Ganoë had presented his "Proposed Initial Plan for Producing the History of the ETO" on 20 May, less than two weeks after his arrival—a standard of staff work well worthy of emula-

tion, as was the objective he laid out in his plan "...to produce a history of the ETO which is at once accurate, balanced, and *readable*" (emphasis added).

The chief of staff approved the plan on 7 June—another miracle of staff work!—whereupon Ganoë submitted a set of proposals that turned out to have lasting influence on the Army historical program in Europe, and probably worldwide. Specifically, he called for the History Section to capture "on the ground and at the time those happenings and statements which have a chance of being lost or distorted later," and to seek "interpretations, explanations, elaborations, and first-hand knowledge of happenings as nearly concurrently...as may be needed for full understanding of them." He also insisted that historians needed access to classified information "to obtain the proper balance and perspective" for their narrative histories.

The latter point caused difficulties, for some staff officers feared that security would be compromised if historians had access to classified information.

Another problem centered around perceptions (or more accurately, misperceptions) of staff officers, many of whom confused the role of the historian with that of the public information officer.

Finally, Ganoë's personnel encountered resistance from staff officers who considered their mission-related day-to-day activities too important, and their time too valuable, to cooperate with historians; they were simply "too busy."

From the outset, Ganoë insisted that the primary purpose of the ETO history program was preservation of the historical record, not publication. Recognizing that not all steps in the decision-making process would be committed to paper, in October 1943 he introduced an oral history program.

His first major success in this area was to receive authorization for the theater historian to attend and record the high-level discussions and decision briefings at Headquarters, Supreme Allied Command. This was followed by an aggressive program to convince general officers and senior colonels to maintain daily records of conversations, meetings, conferences, and oral orders—not detailed, self-written diaries necessarily, but short summaries that could be dictated to a secretary. By May 1944 Ganoë had persuaded 128 generals and other key senior officers of the value of

such a program, and his staff had in place a follow-up system to monitor the note-taking process. (Think of what he might have achieved if microcassette recorders had been available.)

Another aspect of the preservation missions was reflected in Ganoë's October 1943 guidance, which called for units down to the battalion level (and this at a time when regiments still existed as tactical formations!) to maintain complete war diaries and journals and to designate an officer "to oversee the keeping of historical data."

Ganoë was also an early champion of equal opportunity, for in October 1943 he organized a "Past Affairs" element in the History Section under the supervision of a Women's Army Corps (WAC) lieutenant and staffed entirely with enlisted WACs. Their function was to compile an administrative history of the ETO to May 1944, primarily by extracting information from documents in the Adjutant General's records center, to compile an index to the records, and to write a chronology.

The ETO at that point consisted of three main elements, the Services of Supply (SOS), the Ground Forces, and Eighth Air Force—and although it was still a part of the Army at the time, Army Air Forces regulations already called for a separate, independent history program.

Thus, Ganoë's focus was on three broad areas—an administrative history of the ETO, a headquarters history, so to speak; a history of the logistics operations of the SOS; and an operational or tactical history of the Ground Forces.

By June 1944 an impressive historical structure was in place—the staff at ETOUSA headquarters, a historical section at SOS headquarters, nine-man teams (five officers, four enlisted) attached to the G-3 sections at First and Third Armies, and five-man teams (two officers, three enlisted) at each of seven corps and three logistics headquarters. Significantly, both field army commanders (General Omar N. Bradley and Lt. Gen. George S. Patton, Jr.) personally approved the plan to attach history teams to their headquarters. As the ground forces built up on the European continent, similar teams were attached to the headquarters of Seventh, Ninth, and Fifteenth Armies as well.

Like today's military history detachments, the teams' primary mission was to collect and preserve historical information—written records, visual materials, and oral history interviews.

In contrast to more recent military operations, the first of these teams landed in Normandy with the First

Army headquarters on 6 June 1944.

Personnel rosters of the various historical organizations include a number of names that later became well known—Lt. Col. S. L. A. Marshall (who had just arrived in Europe from the Pacific theater, where he pioneered the concept of group postcombat interviews with combat units), Maj. Hugh Cole, Capt. Ken Hechler and Capt. Roland Ruppenthal, Sgt. Gillet Griswold, Sgt. Forrest Pogue, and T/4 Gordon Harrison, to name but a few.

Not surprisingly, the historical teams often encountered difficulties. Despite the attitude of Bradley and Patton, the teams found that many—one source says "most"—staff officers failed to understand the mission of historical teams, and one corps commander flatly refused to allow a team to work in his command. Enlisted members in particular had difficulty getting access to classified records, were denied permission to attend conferences and briefings, and were refused interviews.

As a result, as early as 15 June 1944 the theater commander (General Dwight D. Eisenhower) found it necessary to issue a letter directive emphasizing the importance of allowing historical teams—specifically to include the enlisted members of those teams—untrammelled access to historical data of all kinds.

After the cessation of hostilities, the missions to write the administrative, logistical, and operational histories of the command were withdrawn, those functions subsequently being assumed by the Office of the Chief of Military History (later, the Center of Military History) and realized with the publication of the all-encompassing "green book" series, the U.S. Army in World War II.

Instead, the focus of the Army history program in Europe would thenceforth be on the writing of a detailed history of the occupation—a project that ultimately came to include more than 150 manuscripts, most of which were neither published nor widely distributed.

In the summer of 1945 another mission also emerged gradually and became formal in September. In July a Department of State team visited Europe to interrogate key German prisoners. Maj. Ken Hechler accompanied the group and, upon his return to U.S. Forces, European Theater (USFET)—formerly ETOUSA—headquarters, recommended a formal program to incorporate the experience of German generals and other key staff officers into the U.S. Army organizational histories, which at the time were still a mission of the theater historian.

From its beginnings as a project to interrogate senior prisoners, the program soon evolved into one in which former German officers prepared narrative accounts of their activities in World War II—accounts that eventually constituted the well-known Foreign Military Studies series of some 1,800 manuscripts.

In September 1945 the USFET Historical Division was established as a separate special staff element directly subordinate to the chief of staff. Since Colonel Ganoc had been medically evacuated in May, Col. S. L. A. Marshall was designated as the first division chief. The organization and staffing of the division, incorporating the assets of the former Historical Section and some of the subordinate historical organizations, was completed at Frankfurt, Germany, in January 1946.

With total personnel of 151 (51 officers, 57 enlisted, 16 American civilians, and 27 Allied civilians), the division was organized into sections along functional (i.e., product) lines. As in the case of all organizations, there was a period of adjustment before the structure stabilized in the spring/summer of 1946 with four sections (later redesignated branches): Executive and Administrative, Documents, Operational History (German), and Occupational History—the last responsible for special studies or monographs in addition to what today would be called annual historical reviews (although at first they were written on a quarterly basis).

Not surprisingly, strength authorizations declined from year to year, although the organizational structure remained essentially the same. By the spring of 1959 the division was down to twenty-five persons (four officers, six enlisted, nine American civilians, and six foreign nationals), plus three attached military history detachments of one officer and one enlisted man each.

In July 1959 the division was abolished, the functions of what had been the Occupational History (later, Current History) Branch being assigned to the USAREUR headquarters, assistant chief of staff, G3 (later redesignated ODCSOPS), with a staff of seven (one officer, two enlisted men, four American civilians) in the Historical Section itself, plus three attached military history detachments.

Along with flower children, the Age of Aquarius, and antiwar activism, the decade of the 1960s witnessed further erosion of the historical assets in USAREUR—a nadir being reached in June 1972, when the section was authorized two civilian historians, an editorial assistant, and no military history detachments.

Three years later, in August 1975, the function and

staff were reassigned to the Office of the Secretary of the General Staff, and the following March a third historian was authorized. In the fall of 1976 the two corps headquarters and the support command (currently designated 21st TAACOM) established dedicated full-time positions for professional civilian historians—previously part-time military “historical officers” performed this function.

\* \* \*

For a decade and a half, the mission of the residual fragment of the former Historical Division was relatively uncomplicated, the focus being almost exclusively on the writing of history. The production level was rather impressive—an annual history every year (and not once was a suspense date missed), plus a total of thirteen monographs in the period from 1959 to 1972. (I [Bruce Siemon] take no credit for this; it did not happen on my watch.)

The Historical Section also maintained an informal reference collection, and staff support was the second major function in those years.

During that period we blithely assumed that the records retirement system was working, until Maj. Gen. E. C. Meyer became the USAREUR DCSOPS in September 1973. As many are now, General Meyer was most definitely historically minded, and one of the first things he did that fall was to visit the historian and ask about the retired USAREUR records. Coordination with the records manager soon revealed that precious little was being retired, and thenceforth the USAREUR historian became an active collector and preserver of records.

Although the system is by no means perfect, historians now collect and retire background documents and consult with staff agencies at the year-end “clean out your files” period, sometimes with good results. For example, we were able to capture records of the Class VI Agency when it was discontinued, and also several linear feet of action officer files concerning CFE and structuring issues.

The reassignment to the Office of the Secretary of the General Staff in 1975 brought significant changes. Since then we have had access to all correspondence passing through the Command Group, to include in particular the staff journals and journal files. The new staff alignment also provided enhanced access to staff meetings and decision briefings, greatly improving the historians’ insight into the decision-making process.

In 1977 USAREUR began conducting oral history

interviews, initially an informal program, but subsequently regularized to call for end-of-tour interviews with commanders and other key personnel, e.g., deputy commanders, and chiefs of staff.

The 1982 revision of the Army regulation (AR 870-5) also brought new and expanded missions. Until then, museums in USAREUR had enjoyed benign neglect—the Center curators dealt with the field directly, and the USAREUR historians did nothing. Now, of course, we are much involved.

Since the spring of 1983 historical responsibilities have expanded at the echelons below USAREUR, so that now the divisions, armored cavalry regiments, and “commands” are also required to write annual historical reviews; all rely on part-time “historical officers”—some military, and some civilian.

Also in 1983 we began to get serious about planning for wartime military history operations, and in addition to bringing Reserve Component military history detachments to Europe for training with their CAPSTONE headquarters, the civilian historians in Europe are designated “emergency essential” and tasked to stay on the job—and if necessary to deploy with their headquarters—in wartime or contingency operations. In December 1990, for example, the 3d Armored Division’s civilian curator/historian deployed with the unit to Southwest Asia.

It was also in the early 1980s that the USAREUR

Military History Office became involved with education programs, i.e., staff rides and battlefield tours. We conduct very few ourselves, but we have packets of material on more than a dozen European battlefields (mostly World War II) that we provide to units to assist them in conducting their own professional development programs.

The past two years have been particularly exciting for historians in Europe. We need not review here developments on the international political scene, but suffice it to say that USAREUR historians have been actively involved in capturing the record of planning and preparations for restructuring/downsizing the command and for supporting DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. Two classified containers have been filled with documents, and more than thirty oral history interviews conducted with key personnel, from CINCUSAREUR down to the action-officer level. Writing has begun.

In a sense we have come full circle, back to the objectives stated by Colonel Ganoë in June 1943: To capture “on the ground and at the time those happenings and statements which have a chance of being lost or distorted...” and to seek such “explanations, elaborations, and first-hand knowledge...as may be needed for full understanding.”

I hope Colonel Ganoë would find USAREUR’s current program a worthy successor to his own.

## **The German Invasion of Crete and the Importance of Intelligence and Logistical Planning in the Rapid Deployment of Light Units**

**Mark Edmond Clark**

Long before the leadership of the Soviet Union began to speak about greatly reducing its military forces, and democratic movements began to sweep over Eastern Europe, U.S. Army planners began to rethink the military requirements for their service. The need for heavy armored and mechanized units appeared significantly reduced in recent years; mutual deterrence worked, and war between the United States and the Soviet Union became less likely. At the same time, troubled areas in Africa, Latin America, and the Pacific posed greater potential threats.

After careful consideration, the Army developed highly mobile, hard-hitting light infantry divisions and

brought them on line alongside existing airborne and air assault divisions. Placed under the higher headquarters of the U.S. Army XVIII Airborne Corps, these units could be deployed rapidly to put out fires in troubled regions before they got out of control. (1) Parachute assaults by airborne elements of the corps could save precious time in operations, while air transports could easily place light infantry units in an operational area within a few hours.

This system was highly effective in Panama, where airborne, light infantry, and special operations units of the Army worked in conjunction with Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps elements to secure the entire nation

in a few short days. That operation may well exemplify the future of U.S. warfighting. (2) If such operations ever grow in size and complexity, however, questions may arise about the possibility of overextending the capabilities of the Army's light units.

Light units, similar to those of today's Army, initially were introduced into the Army's force structure over forty-five years ago. Primarily in the form of airborne units, they typically supported larger armored and mechanized operations. (3) The notion of using those light units independently to secure entire hostile areas largely was rejected. The reason for this rejection has been best demonstrated by the German invasion of Crete in 1941.

On Crete, crack German airborne and mountain troops attempted to secure a Greek island one hundred and sixty miles long by forty miles wide from a superior Allied force. The operation was a success, but only at the cost of nearly 50 percent casualties in the 22,000-man invasion force.

As a result, the Germans ceased using large-scale airborne operations for the remainder of World War II. (4) Allied commanders were so impressed with the operation, however, that they hurried to develop their own airborne units, and they attempted to integrate the tactical lessons of Crete into their operations. (5) But tactics were not the most important lessons that Crete provided, as an analysis of the operation makes apparent.

This paper is a brief examination of the German invasion of Crete. It analyzes the planning and execution of the operation and illustrates how the factors of intelligence and logistics greatly affected its outcome. The purpose of the paper is to demonstrate that a successful rapid deployment of airborne and light infantry units is as dependent upon the level of care placed on intelligence analysis and logistical planning as it is on tactics and the quality of the troops employed.

The failure of military commanders to appreciate this dependence has had a tremendous impact on many nations' army operations since Crete. At the same time, so long as it remains a consideration for U.S. Army planners, there are few limits to the size and complexity of future operations employing airborne and light infantry units.

The concept of invading Crete from the air originated in the mind of Generaloberst Kurt Student, commander of the *XI Air Corps*. When he presented the idea to the *Luftwaffe* high command, he explained that the Balkans campaign, which had just concluded, would be only half successful if German forces failed

to take British airfields and seaports on Crete. Those bases threatened German-held oil fields in Rumania. Once it was captured, Student noted, the island could serve as a springboard for an attack on the Suez Canal and Cyprus. The *Luftwaffe* and *Kriegsmarine* could strike at the British fleet at Alexandria, and, once established on Crete, the *Luftwaffe* could support the North Africa campaign.

After listening to Student on 20 April 1941, Reichsmarschall Hermann Goering, *Luftwaffe* commander in chief, and Generalmajor Hans Jeschonnek, *Luftwaffe* chief of staff, agreed wholeheartedly with him. (6) The next day Goering sent Student and Jeschonnek to the German military high command and Adolf Hitler's headquarters to explain the plan. Hitler agreed with Student's plan and supported the use of airborne units for the operation. He recommended, however, that Student attack the island simultaneously at several points, sending in amphibious troops as well. According to Hitler, this would provide him with "more than one leg to stand on." (7)

Much as the airborne and light infantry units of today's Army, the German airborne units used in Crete were assault formations. Their purpose was to fly over the heads of enemy troops to land on and secure ground to the enemy's rear. (8) As individuals, the paratroopers were self-disciplined, highly motivated, and physically fit. Their basic infantry, combat survival, and support skills were held at uncompromising levels. Unit noncommissioned officers and officers were among the best technically and tactically competent in the German Army. The mountain troops possessed many of the same attributes.

Operation *MERKUR*, as the invasion plan for Crete was named, was developed in accordance with Hitler's desire to attack at multiple points, and Student's belief in the overall necessity of the operation, which was to secure the island's threatening airfields and seaports. Four places would be attacked on 20 May by units of the *XI Fliegerkorps*, which included the *7th Air Division* (actually an airborne and glider assault unit) and the *5th Mountain Division*—added at the eleventh hour as a replacement for the *22d Air Landing Division*, which had been held up in Rumania. The two divisions were divided into three groups for the attack.

*Group West*, which consisted of Generalmajor Eugen Meindl's *Assault Regiment*, would begin the attack at 0715. (9) A glider battalion headquarters and two glider-borne companies would land in approximately thirty gliders and attempt to seize anti-aircraft positions and a radio station south of Maleme's airfield.



A regimental battle group, in nine gliders, would follow and seize a key bridge close to the airfield. Once these positions were taken, the remainder of the *Assault Regiment* would capture the airfield itself. The assault regiment would then turn to its secondary mission of supporting *Group Center*'s attack on Canea, twenty-five miles to the east.

*Group Center* consisted of the *3d Airborne Regiment*, the *2d Airborne Regiment*, and the *100th Mountain Regiment* of the *5th Mountain Division*. Its attack would begin simultaneously with the parachute landings in *Group West*. The *3d Airborne Regiment* would land near the Suda naval base. After being reinforced by the *100th Mountain Regiment*, the group would attempt to capture Canea and the towns of Suda and Galatas. Seven hours later the *2d Airborne Regiment*, which was assigned the group's secondary mission, would attempt to capture Rctimo, approximately twenty-five miles east. Two glider-borne companies detached from the *Assault Regiment* were given the special mission of neutralizing antiaircraft positions south and west of Canea and Suda in a preliminary action fifteen minutes before the main landings. A team of airborne engineers was assigned a special flank protection mission for the *3d Airborne Regiment*.

*Group East* consisted of the *1st Airborne Regiment*, the remainder of the *5th Mountain Division*, minus one regiment, and the *2d Battalion, 31st Panzer Regiment*. The *1st Airborne Regiment*'s mission was to capture the town and airfield at Heraklion. It would be reinforced by the *5th Mountain Division*. Some of the mountain troops would arrive by sea, and would be followed by the *2d Battalion, 31st Panzer Regiment*. Most of the mountain troops, however, would arrive in transport planes on the captured airfields at Heraklion and Rctimo. (10)

This plan was designed to attain the commander's objective in the shortest time. The enemy forces on the island were to be caught completely by surprise. They would not be permitted to recover from the shock of the initial effort, and they would never be afforded the opportunity to mass their forces or supporting fires against the attacking force's main effort.

Normally, an operation of this magnitude would be planned along with a precise analysis of the enemy's situation. Such an analysis would include a thorough intelligence assessment of the battlefield, including the identification of high-value targets. (11) An adequate level of analysis, however, was not provided before the invasion of Crete.

Aerial reconnaissance by the *Luftwaffe* was un-

able to establish an accurate picture of Greek, Australian, New Zealander, and British positions. Supply depots were so well camouflaged that they could not be identified on aerial photographs. Even low-level reconnaissance was unsuccessful. (12)

Thus, German planners had to rely greatly upon their military intelligence service (the *Abwehr*) to obtain an estimate of the Allied situation. Although Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, chief of the *Abwehr*, gave his personal attention to Operation *MERKUR*, the picture of the enemy remained clouded. (13) German intelligence, nevertheless, determined that the 10,200 Greek troops would not fight anymore, and that the 15,000 British; 7,750 New Zealander; and 6,500 Australian troops were demoralized to some degree. (14)

This estimate proved to be completely inaccurate. In fact, the troops on Crete were first-class fighting units. The airfields and seaports—key targets of the invasion—were strongpoints of the defense. The Allies knew the German attack was coming, and the troops were on full alert. (15)

The lack of adequate intelligence on the Allied defense resulted in heavy losses for the invasion force. The parachute jumps and glider assaults looked more like a massive suicide attack than a planned military operation.

In *Group West*, the first wave of gliders was met with intensive fire while sailing toward their targets. Once on the ground, they were able to destroy the antiaircraft guns at Canea. They failed to take the radio station, however, and only thirty men managed to link up with the paratroopers of *Group Center*. The parachute jumps of *Group West* had equally unsatisfactory results. Many paratroopers landed safely and were well placed to carry out their original plan of attack. However, some landed east of the target, and entire units were almost totally destroyed before they reached the ground.

In *Group Center*, nearly all the paratroopers who came down near Galatas were killed immediately. Others were too widely dispersed to form concentrated fighting units. Some companies were spread out over a distance of three miles. Fewer than a thousand men of the *3d Airborne Regiment* managed to land in relative safety and unity, and these were unable to break out of a cordon of Australian troops for several days.

In *Group East*, glider and parachute units encountered so much intensive fire from British and Australian troops that their military effectiveness was severely reduced. As a result, they were virtually elimi-

nated from participation in the battle. (16)

In addition to the great impact that inadequate intelligence alone had on the operation's outcome, poor logistical planning also managed to contribute significantly to the debacle.

An operational commander must base his campaign plan on the logistics immediately available to his theater of operations. If there is inadequate support to accomplish the assigned mission, then the operational commander must develop a plan wherein immediate objectives, which can be achieved with available logistics support, become the initial goal of the campaign. (17) While the campaign should be phased so as to achieve all of the assigned objectives, individual phases can be executed only when the necessary logistical means become available within the theater of operations. (18)

Five hundred JU-52 transport planes were scheduled to carry the 15,750 troops going into battle by air. This was an insufficient number of aircraft to bring them to the island in one wave. Thus, the attack had to be phased into an airborne assault and a glider assault wave in the morning, and an airborne assault and an air transport wave in the afternoon. Flight plans were timed precisely in order to prevent any delays in the arrival of the assault waves in the operational areas. Further, the flights were coordinated closely with air support from the fighters and bombers of the *XVIII Fliegerkorps*. (19) In order to meet their schedules, the transports were given very little time to refuel, reload, and reassemble for their afternoon flights after the return to their makeshift dirt runways in Greece.

The amphibious portion of the operation, which would bring the remaining 6,300 troops to Crete, was facilitated by the use of two hastily gathered and improvised flotillas of sixty-three shallow draught Greek barges. (20) They would be escorted by motor torpedo boats of the Italian Navy. As in the case of the transport planes, the boats' approaches to the island had to be well timed. The boats had to reach Crete during the daylight hours of 21-22 May. During the day the Royal Navy did not enter the waters north of Crete because of German air superiority. At night, however, the British could appear and control the sea. (21)

These plans appeared satisfactory, but given the many makeshift arrangements, they were too risky for the operation. Timing and synchronization were emphasized, and the slightest divergence from the set schedules could lead to disaster.

Unfortunately for the Germans, divergences from the schedule did occur. Pilots faced visual problems

from dust on the dirt runways while taking off for their return flights to Crete. Transports did not make formation and execute properly coordinated approaches to drop zones. Many transports failed to reach their objectives with their assigned fighter protection. Corrections could not be made because of inadequate communications between the squadrons of the *VIII Fliegerkorps* and the transports. Of the five hundred planes involved, over half were destroyed. (22)

Neither of the two small flotillas was able to reach Crete during the day. The first wave, which was headed for Maleme on 21 May, was intercepted by British cruisers and destroyers. Most of the boats were rammed or shot to pieces. Only a few boats reached the shore. (23) The second wave, which was headed for *Group West* on 22 May, almost met a similar fate. Support from the Italian Navy, however, kept the losses to only two boats. (24) These flotillas originally were designated for *Group East* and *Group Center*, respectively, but were redirected because of the situation on the island.

Upon receiving reports on the invasion, General Student realized that his forces faced a critical situation. Although his resources were limited, he attempted to bring them to bear for maximum effect.

Currently, accepted doctrine in the U.S. Army holds that success in battle requires that units gain and retain the initiative. Commanders must attack the enemy with firepower and maneuver, and all elements of combat power must be synchronized. Commanders must possess the mental and operational agility necessary to shift forces and fires to the point of enemy weakness more rapidly than the enemy can respond.

Virtually in accordance with these modern concepts, Student decided to abandon the original operational plan. Rather than waiting for the troops on Crete to capture the Retimo and Heraklion airfields before sending the remainder of the *5th Mountain Division* in by air and sea, he decided to redeploy it wholly in *Group West*. He issued orders to speed up the capture of the Maleme airfield in order to facilitate the landings. Once the airfield was taken and reinforcement began, Student would designate *Group West* as the main effort. It would serve as the focal point for combat support and combat service support efforts. *Group West* would move east and roll up the Allied defenses near the coast. (25) The other groups would continue to fight to gain control of their respective areas.

After Maleme's capture, Allied units tried on 21-22 May to retake the airfield and halt the transport of

enemy reinforcements. (26) The paratroopers and mountain troops, however, retained control. On the evening of 22 May Generalleutnant Julius Ringel, who commanded the *5th Mountain Division*, came to Crete and took command of all elements on the western part of the island. In attempting to meet the objectives of Student's new plan, he displayed effective maneuver, positioning his units on the Allied flanks to avoid their greatest strength, while exposing them to possible destruction.

In the initial assault, Ringel sent the *85th Mountain Regiment* southeast into the mountains in an effort to outflank the New Zealanders' defenses, a few miles west of Canea. Meanwhile, he made a frontal attack south of the coast road using the remaining paratroopers of the *Assault Regiment* and the soldiers of the *100th Mountain Regiment*. This action successfully turned the flanks of the Allied defense. The paratroopers and mountain troops, who were moving along the axis of the attack, managed to break through. The New Zealanders' defenses near Canea were overcome on 26 May, and the city fell the next day. By 28 May Suda Bay was under German control.

As the situation improved for the Germans, the Allied force began to withdraw. Many units moved south toward Sfakia, on the southern coast of the island, with the *100th Mountain Regiment* in pursuit. The Royal Navy managed to evacuate about 17,000 troops from Sfakia and Heraklion to the north, transporting them to Egypt. Over 10,000 soldiers, however, were captured. (27) Crete was declared secured on 2 June.

The likelihood that a military operation, once it is under way, will adhere to a plan—especially one put together as hastily as the one for Crete—is quite small. The degree to which the Crete plan stumbled along, however, far exceeded mere statistical chance. Crete was a massive intelligence and logistical failure, and many elite paratroopers and mountain troops were killed unnecessarily because of it.

When planning an operation, a commander should seek to discover the areas in which the enemy is either weak or in force. This knowledge can help to shape tactics and actions in order to succeed against an opponent. At Crete, the *Luftwaffe* could not obtain an adequate level of information on the Allied situation. Despite this, the German planners chose to prepare precise plans for the landings and the attack. They did not provide for the necessary flexibility to adjust to those hidden strengths and weaknesses that would certainly become apparent once contact was made.

Logistical planning for an operation also has hazards. A disadvantage of detailed logistical planning is that it can develop into an exercise in rigidity. Any strategist would prefer to create a plan that would unfold in a predictable manner and would be immune to changing circumstances, but that is seldom possible. Because of constraints on transportation, the airlifts and sealifts to Crete were based on makeshift arrangements and phased into waves. Despite the difficulties that could be expected in any operation under these circumstances, the Germans tried to adhere to their precise plans, particularly in the airlift portion. In the end, they were unable to escape the fog and friction of war.

Miraculously, in spite of the many problems encountered, the Germans managed to emerge victorious. The paratroopers and mountain troops moved quickly, pressed their advantages aggressively, and capitalized on every opportunity to destroy the cohesion of the Allied defense.

In rapid deployment operations, airborne and light infantry units must be brought to their targets by a means that provides a high degree of reliability and must be placed on their targets in a manner that assures a high degree of survivability. This can only be achieved through accurate and adequate logistical and intelligence planning. Once on target, the paratroopers and light infantry troops will use their own special skills to fulfill their mission.

Placing troops in a situation similar to the one the Germans forces faced at Crete would be a very imprudent undertaking, most likely having similar results, even among the best trained and motivated soldiers.

*Mark Edmond Clark is head of his own academic and management consulting firm in New York City and is a frequent contributor to Army History and other American military journals. He holds a master's degree in American history from Columbia University and a Juris Doctor degree from Georgetown University Law Center.*

#### Notes

1. *Army Times*, 1 Jan 90.
2. *Ibid.*
3. John Taylor, *General Maxwell Taylor: The Sword and the Pen* (New York: Doubleday, 1989), p. 93.
4. Rudolf Böhmler and Werner Haupt, *Fallschirmjäger* (Dorheim: Verlag Hans-Henning Podzun, 1971), p. 82.

5. Taylor, *Sword and Pen*, p. 39.
6. Böhmler, *Fallschirmjäger*, p. 77.
7. Charles Whiting, *Hunters From the Sky: The German Parachute Corps, 1940-1945* (New York: Stein and Day, 1974), p. 58.
8. John Keegan, *Six Armies in Normandy* (New York: Viking, 1982), pp. 69-71.
9. Roger Edwards, *German Airborne Troops, 1936-1945* (Garden City: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1974), pp. 84, 96. The 6th Mountain Division was also available to Student for the invasion. Samuel Mitcham, *Men of the Luftwaffe* (Novato: Presidio Press, 1988), p. 118; Whiting, *Hunters From the Sky*, pp. 59-60. Today, it is commonly understood that airborne landings at night have a more devastating effect on the enemy than a day attack. At night, the shape or dimension of an airborne force cannot be determined. The defender is not provided with a focal point or a point to counterattack.
10. Edwards, *Airborne Troops*, p. 84. Support weapons, antitank guns, and antiaircraft machine guns from corps- and division-support specialist units would augment each group in accordance with their expected needs.
11. Anthony Paternoso, "Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield...Made Easy," *Armor* 98 (Nov-Dec 1989): 37-42; Huba Wass de Czege and Lawrence Holder, "The New FM 100-5," *Military Review* 62 (July 1982): 58.
12. Böhmler, *Fallschirmjäger*, p. 77; Edwards, *Airborne Troops*, p. 93. Air reconnaissance capabilities were very limited. For example, geographical features and details could not be properly interpreted from aerial reconnaissance photographs. Clearly, an accurate interpretation of Allied positions could not be anticipated.
13. Edwards, *Airborne Troops*, p. 93; Böhmler, *Fallschirmjäger*, p. 77; Whiting, *Hunters From the Sky*, p. 60.
14. Barrie Pitt and Frances Pitt, *The Month by Month Atlas of World War II* (New York: Summit Books, 1989), p. 44.
15. Böhmler, *Fallschirmjäger*, p. 77.
16. Edwards, *Airborne Troops*, pp. 89-93. Although in this instance it proved to be a deadly undertaking, generally it is best to land directly on an enemy's positions, rather than to come down at a distance and then close in a deliberate approach march and development. The direct assault exploits the element of surprise in the airborne operation and minimizes the effects of the absence of heavy weapons.
17. Clayton Newell, "Logistical Art," *Parameters* 19 (March 1989): 34.
18. Ibid.
19. Böhmler, *Fallschirmjäger*, p. 79.
20. Whiting, *Hunters From the Sky*, p. 77; Böhmler, *Fallschirmjäger*, p. 80.
21. Ibid.
22. Edwards, *Airborne Troops*, pp. 91-93. This figure refers to total losses for the operation.
23. Whiting, *Hunters From the Sky*, pp. 78-79; Böhmler, *Fallschirmjäger*, p. 80.
24. Böhmler, *Fallschirmjäger*, p. 80.
25. Edwards, *Airborne Troops*, p. 90.
26. Ibid., p. 94; Böhmler, *Fallschirmjäger*, p. 80.
27. Böhmler, *Fallschirmjäger*, p. 81.

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### Operation JUST CAUSE and Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM Posters Reminder

Just a reminder to our readers how to order the Center's popular wall posters for JUST CAUSE and DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM: Army account holders should requisition these posters using DA Form 4569 and citing the relevant CMH Publications number (CMH Pub 70-33 for JUST CAUSE, CMH Pub 70-34 for DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM). Individuals also can order these poster for \$5.00 each directly from the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402-9325. Order by title and GPO stock number (GPO S/N 008-029-00222-1 for JUST CAUSE, and GPO S/N 008-029-00223-0 for DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM).

# Conference of Army Historians

8-11 June 1992

## Sunday, 7 June

1400-1800 - Registration for MACOM  
Historians

## Monday, 8 June

0800-1200 - Registration

0800-1100 - MACOM Council Meeting

0800-1700 - MHDs Meeting at Ft. Belvoir

1300-1330 - Welcome: Dr. John Greenwood,  
Brig. Gen. Harold Nelson

1330-1530

### *International Military History Panel*

Chair: Brig. Gen. Harold Nelson, CMH

Dr. P.H. Kamphuis, Chief, Historical Section, Royal  
Netherlands Army

Representative of the Royal Thai Army

Professor De Vos, Royal Military Academy,  
Belgium

Lt. Gen. Sergio Bergamaschi,  
Director of Cultural Affairs, Brazilian Army

1530-1600 - Intermission

1600-1700

### *The Army Historian and Automation*

Col. Thomas Sweeney, Director, MHI

Evening - Open

## Tuesday, 9 June

0800-0830 - Secretary of the Army  
Hon. Michael P. W. Stone

0830-1200

### *THE WAR IN THE GULF AND ITS AFTERMATH*

0830-0930

#### *The Allied Coalition*

Chair: Col. Francois Grenaudier, Assistant Military  
Attache, Embassy of France (Tentative)

John Harding, Army Historical Branch, Ministry of  
Defense, U.K.

Lt. Col. Frederick Guelton, France

Lt. Col. Michael Burke, XVIII Airborne Corps

#### *Documenting Special Stories*

Chair: S. Sgt. Michael Fisher

Capt. Cyrus E. Gwyn, Cmbt. Pictorial Detachment,  
Joint Combat Camera

Lt. Col. Pat Wise, CMH, Medical Operations

Dr. Richard Stewart, Special Operations

0930-1030

#### *Documenting Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm*

Chair: Dr. Charles Cureton

Maj. Christopher Manos - VII Corps

Maj. Robert K. Wright - XVIII Airborne Corps

Maj. William Epley - 22d Supcom

#### *Documenting the Aftermath*

Chair: Dr. John Greenwood

Dr. Janet McDonnell, USACE  
Rebuilding Kuwait

Lt. Col. Gordon Rudd, USMA  
Operation PROVIDE COMFORT

1030-1200

#### *The Historian as Participant*

Chair: Brig. Gen. L. Don Holder, Jr.

Lt. Col. John Sloan Brown, U.S. Naval War College

Maj. Kevin McKedy, USMA

Col. Ralph M. Mitchell, National Defense Univer-  
sity

Lt. Col. Gregory Fontenot, National Defence  
College, Canada

#### *Creating An End Product*

Chair: Dr. Edward Drea, CMH

Mr. Tom Donnelly, *Army Times*

Mr. Brian Duffy, *US News and World Report*

Dr. Frank Schubert, CMH

Col. Richard Swain, CSI

1200-1300 - Lunch - Open

*THE U.S. ARMY IN WORLD WAR II: THE MEDITERRANEAN AND EUROPEAN THEATERS, 1943-45*

1300-1430

*Sicily*

Chair and Comment: Albert Garland (Tentative)

Col. Kenneth Hamburger, USMA

Terrain Problems in the Sicilian Campaign

Dr. James Dunn, USACE

Army Engineers in Sicily

*The Brazilian Expeditionary Force in the Mediterranean Theater*

Chair: Col. John Cash, CMH

Dr. Frank McCann, University of New Hampshire

Dr. Thomas Skidmore, Brown University

General Vernon Walters, USA (Ret.)

Lt. Gen. Sergio Bergamaschi,

Director of Cultural Affairs, Brazilian Army

*U.S. Army Air Forces in the Mediterranean*

Chair: Dr. Herman Wolk, AFHO

Dr. Edward Raines, CMH

Air Observation Posts in the Mediterranean Theater

Dr. Max Schoenfeld, University of Wisconsin, Eau-Claire

The Experience of the 480th Anti-Submarine Group, USAAF, in Support of the Invasion of Italy

Dr. Alan Gropman, National Defense University

Black Air Force Units in the Mediterranean Theater

1430-1500 - Intermission

1500-1630

*Allied Operations in Italy*

Chair: Lt. Col. John Sloan Brown,

U.S. Naval War College

Col. Joseph Bonfiglio, USA (Ret.)

Experiences as an OSS Officer in the Mediterranean Theater

Lt. Col. Scott McMichael, DAMO-SS

The Devil's Brigade

Maj. J.D.C. Bennett, Queen Elizabeth

Military Hospital

Medical Support in the British 8th Army During the Italian Campaign

*The Italian Army*

Chair: General Andrew Goodpaster, USA (Ret.)

Battle Monuments Commission (Tentative)

Lt. Col. Tom Christianson, CSI

Italian Contributions to the Allied War Effort

Col. Giancarlo Gay, Chief, Italian Military History Office

The Italian Army From Sicily to the Breakout of the Gothic Line

Dr. Brian Sullivan, National Defense University  
Activities of Italian Fascists and Their Impact on U.S. Army Operations

*The Allied Armies in Italy*

Chair: Lt. Col. Carlo D'Este, USA (Ret.)

Dr. Dominick Graham

Allied Operational Choices

Dr. William McAndrew, National Defence Headquarters, Canada

Battles for Rome, 1944: Anzio's Liri Valley Connection

Dr. Raymond Callahan, University of Delaware  
Winston Churchill and His Influence on Mediterranean Strategy

Brig. Gen. Felix Sparks, AUS (Ret.)

Experiences at Anzio

1800-2000 - Banquet

Speaker - Army Chief of Staff General Gordon Sullivan

**Wednesday, 10 June**

0800-0930

*Normandy Preparations and Landings*

Chair: Dr. Robert Joy, Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences

Mr. Billy Arthur, CMH

Training the U.S. Army Invasion Force

Mr. Joseph Balkowski

The 116th Infantry: The Assault Force of the 29th Division

Capt. Donald Hall, Army Medical Department Center and School, Ft. Sam Houston  
Medical Support of the Normandy Landing

*The German Army in Normandy*

Chair and Comment: TBA

Lt. Col. Detlef Vogel, MGFA

German Preparations for an Invasion of the West

Dr. Richard DiNardo, St. Peter's College

The Nature of the German Army and the Defense of Normandy

*Intelligence Activities Surrounding the Normandy Invasion*

Chair: Mr. George Constantinides

Mr. Thomas Parrish - TBA

Capt. Anthony Abati, Fort Bragg

Jedburgh Teams and French Resistance Forces

Dr. Keir Sterling, U.S. Army Ordnance Center and School

The Role of Geographers in the OSS

0930-1000 - Intermission

1000-1130

*Normandy to the German Border*

Chair: Col. Robert Doughty, USMA

Maj. Michael Doubler, NGB

Armor and Infantry in the Bocage

Dr. James A. Huston

Third Army Logistics

Col. Jack English, Canadian National Defence University

The Canadian Army in Normandy

*The Invasion of Southern France*

Chair: Dr. Jeffrey Clarke, CMH

Col. Paul Gaujac, Chief of the Historical Service French Army

The Battle of Provence

General William Quinn, USA (Ret.)

General Alexander Patch

Dr. Arthur L. Funk, University of Florida

The Seventh Army and the French Resistance During Operation DRAGOON

*Scientists and the Art of War*

Chair: Dr. Brooks Kleber

Dr. Jeffrey Smart, Chemical Research Development and Engineer Center, Aberdeen Proving Ground  
New Technologies: Chemical Warfare Service Developments During World War II

Dr. Terrence Copp, Wilfrid Laurier University  
Operational Research and the German Army's Real Secret Weapons: The Mortar and the *Nebelwerfer*

Mr. Eugene Visco, Office of the Under Secretary of the Army

Operational Research

1130-1300 - Luncheon

Speaker - Lt. Col. Carlo D'Este, USA (Ret.)

1300-1430

*Armor in the ETO*

Chair: TBA

Col. James Leach, USA (Ret.)

Experiences

Dr. Dale Wilson, Presidio Press

Black Tankers

Dr. Chris Gabel, CSI

Tank Destroyers in the ETO

*The Siegfried Line*

Chair: Col. Steve Bowman, Deputy Brigade Commander, U.S. Army, Berlin

Prof. Joseph Whitehome

The Battle of Schmidt and the Huertgen Forest

Dr. Benjamin Schoenmaker, *Section Militaire*

*Geschiedenis Landmachstaff*, Netherlands

U.S. Army Operations in the Netherlands: MARKET-GARDEN and After, 1944-1945

Col. Norman L. Smith, USA (Ret.)

Experiences With the 102d Infantry at the Siegfried Line, October 1944 -February 1945

*Women and the U.S. Army in World War II*

Chair: Col. Margaret Bailey, USA (Ret.)

Ms. Frances Martin, Chemical Research Development and Engineer Center, Aberdeen Proving Ground

Women Workers in Army Chemical Plants

Col. Rosemary McCarthy, ANC (Ret.)

Army Nurses in the Mediterranean and European Theaters

Dr. Martha Putney

Black WACs

Mrs. Charity Adams Earley

6888th Postal Battalion in the European Theater

1430-1500 - Intermission

1500-1630

*The Army Historical Branch During WWII: The European Theater*

Chair: TBA

Dr. Forrest Pogue

Dr. Richard Leighton

Dr. John G. Westover

Dr. Kenneth Hechler

Dr. Hugh Cole

1800-2000 - Reception

**Thursday, 11 June**

0800-0930

*The U.S. Soldier in the European Theater*

Chair: Dr. Roger Spiller, CSI (Tentative)

Maj. Dean Williams

S.L.A. Marshall

Dr. Francis Steckel, University of Alabama  
Morale Problems of the U.S. Soldier in Combat

Maj. David Lamm

Taylorism and the Development of Replacement  
Theory in the European Theater

*Logistics in the ETO*

Chair: Col. Thomas Sweeney, MHI

Col. Thomas Sweeney

Logistics in the European Theater

Dr. Steve Anders, Quartermaster Corps Historian,  
Ft. Lee, Virginia

ETOUSA Chief Quartermaster Maj. Gen. Robert M.  
Littlejohn

Dr. John Ohl, Arizona State College

Logistics in the ETO: The View From Army Service  
Forces Headquarters

*Battle of the Bulge*

Chair: Lt. Col. James M. Johnson, USMA

Col. Roland Foerster, MGFA

German Perspectives on Operational Thinking in the  
Preparation and Conduct of the Ardennes Offensive,  
1944-1945

Dr. Barry Fowle, USACE

The 51st Engineer Battalion

Professor Luc De Vos, Chair, History Department,  
Royal Military Academy, Brussels  
TBA

0930-1000 - Intermission

1000-1130

*Historical Collections Relating to the Mediterranean and European Theaters*

Chair: TBA

Archivists from MHI

Alan Aimone

WWII Collections at West Point

*Writing the Green Books*

Chair: Brig. Gen. James Collins, USA (Ret.)  
(Tentative)

Dr. Forrest Pogue

Dr. Richard Leighton

Dr. Albert Garland

Dr. Hugh Cole

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## Letters to the Editor

Editor:

Ronald Spector's fine survey of the rise of military history in the United States (*Army History* No. 19, Summer 1991) suffers from Americo-centrism. Omitted is the impact of Theodore Ropp's *War in the Modern World* (1959); Preston, Wise, and Werner's *Men in Arms*; and other paperbacks' history of warfare.

The Army's adoption of *Military Affairs* through bloc subscription for 425 ROTC units (thanks to Col. O.W. Martin, Jr., Brooks Kleber, and Richard Weinert) and a similar move by the Air Force with *Aerospace Historian* also deserve mention.

Other factors that influenced the rise of military history in the United States include the availability of bibliographical guides with specialist chapters by known scholars covering official histories, British, American, and international work, and the increasing interest by publishers in accepting and selling military history.

Actually, the "new" military history goes back to the study of the Russo-Japanese War and to the Australian histories of both World Wars I and II, as well as to military, naval, and air medical histories.

Lastly, one must mention the International Commission on Military History and the rise of American participation, led by Col. John E. Jessup, Jr. (formerly of the Center of Military History) from 1975 to 1991.

The rise of military history in the United States has been much wider than merely in the field of American history, as demonstrated by such articles as those on the U.S. historiography of World War II published in *La Seconda guerra mondiale* (1977) and *Neue Forschungen zum Zweiten Weltkrieg* (1990).

U.S. scholars have developed a truly global interest and many of them, such as Roger Beaumont, Dennis Showalter, and John T. Greenwood, led the new military history before it was discovered by latecomers.

Robin Higham  
Editor and Professor of  
Military History  
Kansas State University

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**Book Review**  
by Edward J. Drea

***Bataan: Our Last Ditch***  
by John W. Whitman  
Hippocrene Books. 754 pp., \$29.95

American-led forces on Bataan surrendered to the *Japanese Imperial Army* on 9 April 1942 after a ninety-three day siege. During those desperate days, the American public received a carefully filtered description of the U.S. Army's first battle of World War II. Much of what the public heard was blatant propaganda, generously supplied by official and unofficial sources alike. Today, fifty years after the fall of Bataan, Lt. Col. John W. Whitman has given us a detailed tactical history of the campaign. His accomplishment is all the more remarkable because he had to reconstruct the campaign battles without the aid of extensive documentation or detailed secondary reports.

Whitman's ability to integrate hundreds of interviews with surviving veterans as well as extensive correspondence with participants into a smooth-flowing narrative results in a well-organized and well-told story. His eye for the illustrative detail enlivens and enriches his narrative. In short, Colonel Whitman has written a first-rate account of a long overdue campaign study. Campaign history in turn highlights the many strengths and few weaknesses of his account.

*Bataan: Our Last Ditch* is an excellent example of the so-called traditional military history. Colonel Whitman's tactical analysis and discriminating assessments of weapons, terrain, training, logistics, and so forth make his work a primer for junior officers. He approaches the campaign with a critical spirit, yet maintains his objectivity throughout the narrative. The high commands, personified by Lt. Gen. Masaharu Homma and General Douglas MacArthur, respectively, do not fare well under the glare of historical inquiry. Homma's veteran Japanese troops missed several opportunities because he was unsure of his exact mission and objective. MacArthur interpreted events and issued communiques as he wished things would be, not as they were. Yet it is at the tactical level that *Bataan* excels, as Whitman captures the chaos and turmoil of an unprepared army thrown into desperate combat.

As Colonel Whitman acknowledges, his traditional history approach excludes the larger context of the Bataan campaign, earlier operations on Luzon and in the Pacific, world events, political ramifications in

the Philippines and in the United States, and grand strategy. In the era of the "new military history," his tactical focus may seem overly narrow or too specialized for a general reader, yet by explaining in detail the experience of the terrible campaign on Bataan in 1942, Whitman's fine book reminds us anew that armies exist to fight and that the price of unpreparedness is high, borne less by the politicians and strategists than by the privates, corporals, sergeants, and junior officers who must go forward into battle.

*Dr. Edward J. Drea is chief of the Research and Analysis Division, U.S. Army Center of Military History.*

**Book Review**  
by Thomas M. Huber

***Anywhere-Anytime: The History of the Fifty-Seventh Infantry (PS)***  
by John E. Olson and Frank O. Anders  
John E. Olson. 238 pp., \$15.00

This volume is a good brief history of one of the regiments of Philippine Scouts that were formed during United States jurisdiction in the Philippine Islands. They were inspired by the successful earlier tradition of U.S. Army Indian Scouts, and they existed in some form from the earliest years of the American presence. The 57th (PS) was commissioned from 1920, inactivated in 1949, and disbanded in October 1951. Its enlisted men and noncommissioned officers were almost entirely Filipino, and its officers were virtually all U.S. Army officers. The unit crest embraced the "Lone Star" of Texas and the sea lion of the Philippines.

The mix worked extremely well, and the U.S. Army probably deserves more credit than it gets historically for working effectively with persons of different cultures. It is hard to imagine units like this genuinely cohesive if they had been led by officers from the *Imperial Japanese Army*, for example.

The 57th (PS) fought on Bataan in the spring of 1942, and was subjected both to the rigors of battle and the rigors of surrender. This work describes the events of the Philippine campaign before and during the Bataan struggle from a regiment's-eye view that holds many interesting details often missing from accounts focused on higher echelons. The regiment earned seventy-four silver stars, among other awards, before demobilization shortly after Philippine independence.

This study is comparable in tone and coverage to

the better official histories. There are useful appendices listing the 57th's commanders, medal recipients, casualties, and the like. This privately published book is well produced, and the photographs well chosen, although four pages in this reviewer's copy missed the binder's needle completely, and one or two of the hand-drawn maps could have been tidier.

On the whole, *Anywhere-Anytime* is a useful and welcome addition to the regimental literature.

*Interested persons can order this volume directly from Col. John E. Olson, USA (Ret.), One Towers Park Lane # 510, San Antonio, Texas 78209.*

*Dr. Thomas M. Huber is a historian at the Combat Studies Institute, with a special interest in the Bataan campaign (see p. 1 of this issue).*

#### **Book Review by David Hogan**

***Secret Forces of World War II*  
by Philip Warner  
Scarborough House Press. 231 pp., \$22.95**

A commando raid on Erwin Rommel's supposed headquarters. "Immodest" French farmer's daughters who distract German guards long enough for Allied saboteurs to make their escape. A British commando who dines on twigs, leaves, insects, and—yes—slugs. A body that washes ashore on the Spanish coast, bearing a fake dispatch to trick the Germans into believing that the Allies were about to attack Sardinia instead of Sicily. A Communist guerrilla leader who is saved by an American medic and goes on to lead North Vietnam against the United States twenty years later. All this and more appears in Philip Warner's *Secret Forces of World War II*.

Warner, a former lecturer at the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst and author of a number of popular histories and reviews, has produced a veritable smorgasbord of "secret" forces, ranging from paratroopers and commandos to codebreakers and agents. The book makes no pretensions to be an analytical treatment of such issues as the proper role of secret forces and the problem of misuse, launching directly into the story of airborne troops after a few initial, broad comments on the importance of secret forces. Written in a rather chatty style, frequently going off on tangents, the narrative at times reads more like a stream

of consciousness, leaping in one spot from covert rubber trading in Southeast Asia to Col. Wendell Fertig's guerrillas in the Philippines.

The author does not cover all the secret forces of World War II, admittedly an impossible task in one volume. He focuses on the British and on Western Europe and the Mediterranean. For an American edition, the book gives remarkably little attention to American secret forces, not even mentioning Russell Volkmann's guerrillas in northern Luzon, the raids on prisoner of war camps at Los Banos and Cabanatuan, the activities of the Alamo Scouts, and the odyssey of Nicol Smith. When it does cover American special operations, as in the case of Merrill's Marauders, the discussion is often spotty and unclear, implying that the author does not possess a firm grasp of the activities of those units. As inadequate as is the treatment of American units, the discussion is even weaker in its treatment of Axis secret forces. Granted, sources in English on Axis secret activities are often hard to find, but some do exist, notably David Kahn's *Hitler's Spies*, which the author apparently never examined.

The narrative contains a number of other irritations. The author shows a tendency toward overstatement, as in his assertion that World War II, without a knowledge of secret operations, "seems a jumble of unlinked operations." At times, his prose turns banal, as in his statement that Maj. Gen. Orde C. Wingate "believed fervently that the most effective form of warfare was to drive a deep wedge into and behind the enemy lines," and "No army likes to feel that the enemy is busy establishing strongpoints behind it on its line of communications." A number of minor errors also mar the discussion, including wrong dates for Wingate's proposal to the Allied Joint Planning Staff (July 1944, after his death?); his statement that every Jedburgh team contained British, French, and American representatives; and his assertion that the original name of the OSS (Office of Strategic Services) was the Office of the Coordinator of Strategic Information, and that SO stood for Sabotage Operation.

Although the author has examined a wide range of sources, he did miss some important ones, including Lord Lovat's memoirs and David Kahn's *The Codebreakers*.

Notwithstanding the assertions in the preface, one can hardly call this book a groundbreaking work. The author's basic point is sound, but hardly revolutionary. Secret activities, such as the decoding of ULTRA and MAGIC, and partisan raids that delayed the assembly of German reserves during the crucial early days of the battle of Normandy, did make a major contribution to



the eventual victory, but the war could not have been won without the operations of mass units. Beyond that point, the book presents not so much analysis as a series of tales. As a popular account, it might have value but for all the errors that creep into the manuscript. Given these faults, one finds it hard to recommend it even as a general survey of secret operations in World War II.

*Dr. David Hogan is a historian in the Center's Histories Division. He is the author of U.S. Army Special Operations in World War II, and is working on a forthcoming book on Army Rangers from World War II through the invasion of Grenada.*

### **Book Review**

by Edgar F. Raines, Jr.

#### ***A History of Army Aviation, 1950-1962***

by Richard P. Weinert

Office of the Command Historian, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).  
318 pp.

In the late 1960s, Mr. Richard P. Weinert, a historian with the Continental Army Command (CONARC) History Office, began conducting research on CONARC's role in the development of Army aviation between 1950 and 1962. His work was intended to be one of a series of command monographs on the topic supporting a major volume on the history of Army aviation, to be prepared in what was then the Office of the Chief of Military History, now the Center of Military History. Because of the complexity of the subject and the press of other business normal in the history office of any major command, Weinert tackled the project in segments.

CONARC published the first in 1971: it covered the years 1950 through 1954, ending with the movement of the Aviation School to Fort Rucker. The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), which picked up the project when CONARC disappeared in the 1973 reorganization of the Army, published the second segment in 1976. It detailed the period 1955 to 1962 and ended with the preliminaries for the Howze Board. Weinert never wrote the third and final segment dealing with the Howze Board, although he continued to hope that he might find the time, until his retirement in 1988. Of all the aviation studies originally planned, only Weinert's two monographs reached the publication stage—a tribute to

Weinert's good work and to the professionalism of the CONARC and later TRADOC history offices. Without the strong support of the command historian, Dr. Brooks E. Kleber, the project would never have reached fruition.

The two monographs, which provide an authoritative account of CONARC's role in the development of Army aviation during this formative period of its history, have been in great demand since their initial photo-offset publication. When Dr. Kleber's successor, Dr. H. O. Malone, decided to republish them, he elected to combine them into one volume. Before Weinert retired, he took the initial steps to pull the two together, e.g., eliminating duplications. Dr. Susan Canedy of the TRADOC history office continued the process and copyedited the entire manuscript. The resulting volume is a handsome reference tool, valuable to both the aviation and historical communities.

The book is not a history of Army aviation during the years 1950-1962. Rather, it is an account of the record that Headquarters, CONARC, and its predecessor agencies compiled while dealing with the aviation issue, with some treatment of events on the Army Staff level, and rather less attention to developments at the Army Aviation School. Relentlessly, the focus is upon events in the continental United States. Army aviation's participation in the Korean War occurs entirely off-stage. Weinert is concerned exclusively with the reaction of the Department of the Army and the Office of the Chief of Army Field Forces staff. This bare bones treatment ends in 1955. For the remainder of the volume, Weinert effectively placed the aviation story within the context of the "New Look" policies of Dwight D. Eisenhower's administration and the debate over massive retaliation versus flexible response.

In the first section, the author often neglects to identify the officers who held key positions in the military hierarchy. The result is a severely impersonal history in which various nameless officials interact. In the second part of the book, Weinert is careful to name them. Clearly he used the five years between the publication of the two segments to good advantage, not only in mastering the technical details, but also in reflecting on their larger implications.

One of the drawbacks in a headquarters history such as this volume, which is preeminently history from the top down, is that the pilots and mechanics who flew and serviced Army aircraft have almost no role in their own history. They are always acted upon, never actors. The founder of the modern Army aviation program, Col. W. W. Ford, is mentioned on page 7; the next pilot Weinert identifies by name is Brig. Gen. Carl

J. Hutton, who first appears on page 100. One hopes a more comprehensive account will find a larger role for the aviators.

*Dr. Edgar F. Raines, Jr., is a historian in the Center's Histories Division. He is currently working on a manuscript tentatively titled "In the Nap of the Earth: A History of Army Aviation."*

## Book Review

by John M. Carland

***The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign: A Study of Failure in High Command***  
Praeger. 347 pp., \$47.95

The performance of the Canadian Army in Normandy in the summer of 1944 was "disappointingly lackluster." (p. 3) Why was this so? The conventional explanation has been "our own [Canadian soldiers'] shortcomings" which made them "no match" for the battle hardened Germans. (pp. 3-4)

In *The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign: A Study of Failure in High Command*, John English, a Canadian soldier best known for his 1981 classic *On Infantry*, offers an interpretation markedly at odds with the conventional one. "The Canadian field force" in Normandy, writes English, "was from its inception compromised by a military leadership that had for too long concentrated on bureaucratic, political, stratego-diplomatic, and technical pursuits to the neglect of its operational and tactical quintessence. Having forsaken its Great War professional legacy and military *raison d'être* during the interwar years, the Canadian high command proved incapable of conducting worthwhile training in Britain. The overseas army thus largely wasted its time and had to be retaught by others the business of war, which truly professional armies had long recognized was more profitably studied in peace." (p. xiv)

He further argues that the years spent in Britain being "retaught" were not as profitable as they should have been for the Canadian Army. (p. xiv) English—concentrating on the combat arms, and really more on infantry than the others—develops his argument in a straightforward narrative of the Canadian Army from World War I through late summer 1944.

After exploring World War I's legacy for the Canadian Army, the influence of the British Army on the development of the Canadian Army in the interwar period, and various other subjects—force development, equipment, staff structure, doctrine, etc.—rel-

evant to understanding the Canadian Army's situation as World War II approached, English next takes the reader through an account of how the Canadian field army came to be in wartime and trained for combat. Finally, the book relates the experience of the Canadian Army in action during the summer months of 1944.

Some interesting points are made along the way. For example, the Canadian land force during and at the end of World War I "was one of the finest fighting formations in the forces of the British Empire." (p. 308) However, during the interwar period the Canadian political and military leadership lost sight of this tradition due to "an older entrenched militia tradition that perpetuated the illusion of citizen-soldier superiority and the game of political patronage." (p. 308) The predominance of such a tradition virtually ensured that as Canada entered World War II the "art of war fighting" would have for all intents and purposes died. General Andrew McNaughton, the key military figure in the interwar period and for most of the period when the Canadian Army did garrison duty in England in the early years of the war, assumed erroneously that "military knowledge was mainly a matter of technical efficiency that any scientifically educated person could master probably better than a regular officer." (p. 308) Furthermore, budgetary problems and the desire on the part of the military to keep a low profile made certain that operational skills as such, especially those useful above the regimental level, would not survive.

During the early years of the war, according to English, the training given both officers, line and staff, and their noncommissioned counterparts was inadequate. Although line and staff officers and troops participated in numerous exercises in Britain prior to the summer of 1944, such training "did not entirely expunge either those weaknesses in the Canadian military system that existed before 1939 or those attributed to rapid expansion after war was declared." (p. 311) For example, English believes that the high command in the Canadian Army slighted the need for combined arms training with the result that some Canadian combat commanders in Normandy "unknowingly and unnecessarily cast the lives of their soldiers away." (p. xv)

The story is tolerably well told. English is particularly effective in the capsule portraits he provides of the senior Canadian commanders—Generals McNaughton, Crerar, Simmonds, Foulkes, and others. His special affection for Simmonds probably prompts him to overstate Simmonds' ability. A better editing job would have made the book more readable by deleting super-

*(Continued on p. 60)*

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fluous adjectives and pompous phrasing. There are too many occasions when constructions such as "it has been claimed," "it is not proposed," "it is of course realized," "it is expected," and the like litter the landscape. The maps are not up to the task of illustrating the operations.

The above notwithstanding, the reader comes away from the narrative well informed and able to make his own judgment regarding the author's thesis. In this context "not proven" comes to mind as the most sensible verdict. English does indeed demonstrate that a certain ineptness characterized the Canadian high command regarding both training and combat especially before but also during the war. But he does not, and this is crucial, directly and convincingly link this ineptness in the high command to the "feeble performance" of the Canadian Army in the summer of 1944. His evidence is for the most part circumstantial. Furthermore, and this is almost as critical, he assumes rather than demonstrates that if the Canadian high command had been adequate the troops would have fought well. This is by no means as crystal clear to the reader as it is to the author. He has not disproved the conventional interpretation. Even if well-led, the troops, for a variety of reasons, might have fought poorly. A more tenable hypothesis would be to combine the two concepts—leadership and quality of troops—and argue that better leadership and better troops (however

defined) would have resulted in a superior and more accomplished fighting force.

*John M. Carland holds a doctorate in British Imperial History from the University of Toronto. He is the author of The Colonial Office and Nigeria, 1898-1914, as well as numerous articles on British colonial administration and Canada in the Commonwealth. He is currently working on a Vietnam operational history in the Center's Histories Division.*

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